Foreign Policy of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Upland development policy, livelihood change and land degradation: interactions from a Laotian village

“…As described by Rigg (2005: 67), 'minorities are thinly represented in government, have significantly worse health and education profiles than the Lao, and are de facto if not de jure socially, politically and economically excluded'. In fact, despite a number of official statements regarding the multi-ethnic and egalitarian character of the country, the lowland/upland dichotomy is almost institutionalised in Laos and references, both official and informal, to the duality between 'modern lowlands' and 'backwards uplands' are recurrent (Goudineau, 2000;Aubertin, 2001;Rigg, 2005;Stuart-Fox, 2005). Therefore, land degradation studies sponsored by international development agencies (such as those cited in the introduction of this paper) provide ideal grounds for the Lao leadership to expand its control over the upland territory, in the guise of development interventions.…”

The Rentier State at Work: Comparative Experiences of the Resource Curse in East Asia and the Pacific

“…But weak procurement controls have led to a group of rising new contractors with family and business connections to senior officials benefitting disproportionately from resource‐backed public investment. In this respect, the resource sector mirrors the economy more broadly, where the marketisation reforms introduced in 1986 have cemented the concentrated and inter‐locking political–economic dominance of the powerful Lao clans that dominate the Party and government decision‐making (Stuart‐Fox ; Soukamneuth ).…”

Reining in Provincial Fiscal ‘Owners’: Decentralization in Lao PDR

“…Some authors however place the origins o f this institutional inertia of provincial autonomy in the ancient organization o f countries in district-like units called meuangs. The meuangs were ruled by aristocratic families that, although officially pledged alliance to the royalty, enjoyed considerable discretion in local affairs (Stuart-Fox, 2005).…”

“…Moreover, the Central Government capacity to directly appoint Governors -capacity, it can be assumed, adequately sanctioned by the The overlap between the Party and the Executive, and the Party and the Army are considerable, and usually the highest ranking bureaucrats and politicians are also serving or former army officers. The ranks are filled with veterans from the Revolutionary struggle that brought the Party to power and who view any kind o f reform that may limit the power o f the Party and the Army with extreme reticence (Stuart-Fox, 2005). From that perspective, the restructuring o f central-provincial fiscal relations, including the re-allocation o f sources o f revenue to the central level or the proposed increased monitoring capacity required for the Ministry o f Finance would alter very substantially the current balance o f power.…”