Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?

Torsvik, Gaute

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.008

Cited by 70 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…As is shown, in the context of the UN, the aid-effectiveness debate has presented a major impulse for the increased focus on the RC system in recent years (compare also the comprehensive study by Vatterodt 2008). The negative consequences on recipient countries of the increasingly fragmented state of the international aid architecture (Riddell 2007;Reisen 2009) have generally been well documented (Torsvik 2005;Knack / Rahman 2008). Throughout the debate, aid coordination has been identified as one useful approach for addressing these negative externalities.…”

Section: The State Of Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward

Mahn

2013

SSRN Journal

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Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb. Tables Table 1: The 32 Members of the United Nations Development Group 47 Table 2: Milestones in the evolution of UN country-level aid coordination 76 Table 3: Leadership role for UN in external aid coordination 84 Table 4: Size of UN Country Teams by world regions 87 Table 5: Adaptation patterns of the RC system 103 IntroductionThe fragmentation of the United Nations (UN) development system requires aid coordination to bring about a more consistent whole. As the "lynchpin of coordination" at the country level, the system of Resident Coordinators (RCs) is a key driver of coherence for the operational activities of the UN for development.With overall contributions totalling more than US$ 22 billion annually, the UN is one of the "big players" in development. Active across sectors and dealing with a multitude of development challenges, the UN member states have created a complex UN development system that consists of 37 different funds, programmes and agencies with operational activities at the country level. All of the UN entities have countless achievements to show for their development success, yet at the same time it has become a commonplace that the UN development system collectively "punches below its weight". Making the different components of the "UN puzzle" fit together is a substantial challenge for country-level aid coordination.Currently, reforms are underway to make headway towards more coherence. Because of a political impasse among member states in reaching consensus about changes at the global level, a pragmatic shift of attention towards the country-and operational levels can be observed, with a particular focus on the RC system. Tasked with strengthening the effectiveness, efficiency and relevancy of the UN development system through coordinating assistance and activities of the UN entities in each of the 130 partner countries, the RC normally is the UN's highest-ranking official on the ground. In that sense, it is not surprising that a functioning RC system has been deemed key for the overall functioning of the UN system at the country level. Moreover, in a majority of countries, the RC also has a leadership role, together with partner governments, in coordinating all aid coming from the broader bilateral and multilateral donor community, giving it additional weight in the process.Against this background, this study offers an in-depth examination and assessment of UN country-level aid coordination mechanisms revolving Theoretical perspectives on aid coordinationAs part of donor harmonisation, aid coordination has been highlighted in the discourse about aid-and development effectiveness emanating from the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness an...

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Section: The State Of Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward

Mahn

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…Alternatively, group r then is viewed as committing to a particular level of T at the time aid is provided. Note also that our T variable is defined with the opposite sign relative to its use in Torsvik (2005). of donor involvement (assuming that the elite can block the involvement of donors), with donors maximising their total utility given this constraint.…”

Section: A 'First-best' Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When h is small, the cooperative solution is the more efficient of the two. As in Torsvik (2005), the cooperative solution is generally advantageous given that diversion is less than half, i e. h < ½.…”

Section: B the First-period Ne Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralised and cooperative aid provision with short‐term and long‐term aid

Strand

2009

J of Intl Development

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We analyze two donors providing long- and short-run aid to one receiving (poor) country, and who may give aid in coordinated or non-coordinated fashion. An elite controls receiver policy, and diverts resources away from a poor target group. When strategic moves are simultaneous, there is excessive wasteful short-run aid diversion, which could be made worse by donor cooperation. When donors move first, aid is lower, donor utility is higher, and donors should always cooperate. Investments, by the receiving country and due to long-term aid, is greater and the solution more efficient when investments are complements than when they are substitutes. The model characterizes donors that may be considered as “gullible”, or as “skeptical”. The former type gives generously but its aid is largely wasted; the latter gives less aid, but also wastes less. Copyright Â© 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…2 For example, Devarajan, Miller, and Swanson (2002) estimate that an increase of $40-70 billion per year is needed, which amounts to a doubling of official aid compared to 2000. 3 Also see Svensson (2000) and Torsvik (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Buying Influence: Aid Fungibility in a Strategic Perspective

Hagen¹

2006

Review Development Economics

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I study equilibria of non-cooperative games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor's influence over outcomes is increasing in the share of the available resources it controls; if this share is large enough, aid is not fungible. The game-theoretic approach to fungibility is contrasted with the traditional non-strategic approach. I argue that the former is superior as it derives final allocations instead of assuming them, making analysis of the sources of influence over outcomes possible.

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Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?

Cited by 70 publications

References 10 publications

Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward

Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward

Decentralised and cooperative aid provision with short‐term and long‐term aid

Buying Influence: Aid Fungibility in a Strategic Perspective

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