Foreign Direct Investments: impact of party affiliation on the Brazilian subnational allocation of investments

Abstract

Is party affiliation an important aspect of the subnational allocation of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Brazil? If important, would a governor from a more pro-business party affiliation attract more investments than a pro-labor one? Based on the availability of data from the Electronic Declaratory Registration -Foreign Direct Investment (EDR -FDI) and Quinquennial Census of Foreign Capital, both by the Brazilian Central Bank (BACEN), I examined FDI patterns from 2011 to 2016. More specifically, the research developed: a quantitative analysis of political and economic determinants for the subnational attraction of FDI; and a qualitative investigation of one state, Minas Gerais (MG), for a closer evaluation. Based on the results of the Arellano-Bond (1991) models, market size, service sector agglomeration, states' trade dimension, and partisan affiliation, especially if the governor is from PSDB (pro-business), are relevant factors for FDI subnational allocation. In turn, the results suggested that a higher cost of bureaucracy and alignment with the president's political party decrease FDI. The MG in-depth case refined the importance of pro-business party affiliation by characterizing the two administrations of PSDB (pro-business) and one administration of PT (pro-labor). Interviewees analyzed the role of different party affiliations in the state government, and a pro-business party impacted how the governor treated foreign investors. The party affiliation aspect was fundamental for consultants, civil servants, and lobbyists in FDI subnational allocation.