Foreign direct investment in the Ottoman Empire: Attitudes and political risk

Geyikdagi, V. Necla; Geyikdagi, Mehmet Yasar

doi:10.1080/00076791.2011.565514

Cited by 5 publications

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“…Jervis’s (1978) concept of security dilemma, Waltz’s (1979) chain-ganging hypothesis, and the subsequent scholarship building on them (Christensen and Snyder, 1990, 2011; Lieber, 2007; Snyder, 1984; Tierney, 2011; Van Evera, 1984) offer a realist explanation of the origins of the First World War, but this corpus does not suffice to explain specific decisions such as why the Ottomans sided with Germany as opposed to another power like France, which was their main creditor (Geyikdagi, 2011: 51), largest investor (Geyikdagi, 2011: 57), and a major arms supplier (Grant, 2002: 32–33). Indeed, archival documents reveal a dissonance between IR’s theories and history’s accounts of alliance behavior.…”

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Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances

Sazak

2020

European Journal of International Relations

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If all states want to survive, why do some of them enter unpropitious alliances? International Relations (IR) theory’s conventional answer is that imperfect information and systemic complexity result in miscalculation. This explanation begs the question: any alliance that fails is a miscalculated one, so the puzzle is not whether but why such mistakes are made. This article imports from recent scholarship on network theory and interpersonal trust to offer an alternative explanation. Alliances are not entities ethereally formed out of strategic imperatives, but products of interactions within transnational social networks of political, military, and business elites in the prospective allies. Such interactions enable alliances because people who are connected to each other through mutual association or previous exchanges develop mutual trust and gain subjective certainty about each other’s intentions and capabilities, which points at a previously ignored mechanism in alliance behavior: brokerage. In a case study that combines theory-based archival research and social network analysis, this article uses historical evidence on the Turco-German alliance to empirically demonstrate the brokerage role Colmar von der Goltz, the head of the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire, played in the two countries’ relations at the turn of the century and their eventual alliance in the First World War. The analysis points at a potential means of bridging IR, history, and sociology while expanding our understanding of alliance behavior and providing policy-relevant insights on geo-economic competition and the weaponization of interdependence at a time of growing strategic rivalry on the world stage.

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confidence: 99%

Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances

Sazak

2020

European Journal of International Relations

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Set and Forget? The Evolution of Business Law in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey

Artunç¹

2021

Bus. Hist. Rev.

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This study examines the transplantation and evolution of business law in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish republic, drawing broader implications for the economic and political determinants of legal transplantation for late industrializers. We show that the underlying political economy context was influential in shaping the way commercial law was transplanted and evolved in Turkey. Extraterritorial rights in the nineteenth century eroded the incentives to demand legal change by providing alternative legal rules to the non-Muslim commercial elite; the nation-building efforts of the twentieth century cultivated a new Muslim business class that was reliant on the state's goodwill for success and could not effectively push for more open access to novel forms of business organization.

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International mercantile networks and financial intermediation in nineteenth century Scania (Sweden). Foreign private capital imports and informal credit market imbalances

Perlinge

2019

Business History

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Estimates of informal credit markets in nineteenth century Sweden tend to indicate that debts were much more widespread than claims. If this is not just coincidental-however, these studies are statistically insignificant-further research needs to elucidate whether this is connected with direct private capital imports through regional cities by merchants, and whether they were intermediaries for mercantile credits to the agrarian sector. The outcome indicates a previously unnoticed importance of such capital imports. Credit market estimates from cities need be adjusted somewhat upwards. However, capital flows to the countryside obviously went through established retailers, not directly to farmers.

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Foreign direct investment in the Ottoman Empire: Attitudes and political risk

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances

Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances

Set and Forget? The Evolution of Business Law in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey

International mercantile networks and financial intermediation in nineteenth century Scania (Sweden). Foreign private capital imports and informal credit market imbalances

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