For the People, of the People and by the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey

Abstract

The arrival, and subsequent longevity, of the military in politics in much of the Middle East over the last 50 years or so has elicited considerable attention. This is, perhaps, particularly so in Turkey, where, since 1909, there has been only 10 years in which a fully civilian administration has governed. Recently, the collapse of the Kurdish Workers Party and the beginning of a process of constitutional amendment aimed at meeting EU accession criteria has sharpened the controversy over the role of the military in the Turkish polity. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by analysing the methods through which military rule has been perpetuated since the Second World War. Using the work of the sociologists Eric Nordlinger and Michael Mann, I argue that two succinct regime strategies are discernible. The first -semi-authoritarian incorporation -was deployed throughout Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s. Following the 1980 coup, however, it existed alongside a second method -autocratic militarism -which emerged in south-east Anatolia. Thus, the primary purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation for the structure of these strategies.In this paper, I will look at the manifestations of Turkish militarism from the 1960 intervention to the early 1990s and make three basic assertions. First, during this period the military elite has sought to enhance its economic position by institutionalising closer ties with both domestic industrial capitalism and the international neo-liberal order. Second, in pursuing this objective, these commanders have found the management of the internal divisions within the officer corps of the Turkish armed forces increasingly problematic. Third, these two factors have shaped the different ways in which the forces of domestic repression have blended with pressures for greater social representation in Turkey. During the post-war period this has lead to the formation of a hybrid regime combining different elements of autocratic militarism and semi-authoritarian incorporation. I conclude that the methods of rule deployed by the military elite over the last 50 years or so have been moulded by the over-lapping, yet often contradictory, objectives of maintaining its preeminence over the civilian sphere, securing closer ties with corporate capitalism and strengthening the internal cohesion of the officer corps. MilitarismThere remains considerable debate over the precise relationship between military and political elites. Writers such as Edward Shils have suggested that the lowermiddle-class origins of much of the developing world's officer corps tends to make them unsympathetic to the conservative interests of big business and are thus a

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