2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jisa.2020.102535
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Flow based monitoring of ICS communication in the smart grid

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Cited by 14 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…To realize the smart city, 'Instrumentation and Control' acts as the first and main enabler and its communication system plays the main gamechanger role. From the perspective of an instrumentation engineer, a profound analogy exists between Instrumentation Telemetry System (ITS) and Smart Grid Communication System (SGCS) [8][9][10], therefore, while designing a communication system, the smart grid's applications and relevant parameters need careful investigation. Smart grid is considered as a Cyber Physical System (CPS) and overall reliability of the smart grid is therefore dependent upon the reliability of its communication system [11].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To realize the smart city, 'Instrumentation and Control' acts as the first and main enabler and its communication system plays the main gamechanger role. From the perspective of an instrumentation engineer, a profound analogy exists between Instrumentation Telemetry System (ITS) and Smart Grid Communication System (SGCS) [8][9][10], therefore, while designing a communication system, the smart grid's applications and relevant parameters need careful investigation. Smart grid is considered as a Cyber Physical System (CPS) and overall reliability of the smart grid is therefore dependent upon the reliability of its communication system [11].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…through analysing network traffic. The authors later extended their work by proposing an anomaly detection approach based on an analysis of SCADA protocol communication to point resource scanning, rogue devices, and unusual traffic (Matousek et al 2020). They employ finite state automata to infer the IEC 104 communication flow profile of two SCADA nodes.…”
Section: Anomaly Detection In Scada Communication Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They employ finite state automata to infer the IEC 104 communication flow profile of two SCADA nodes. If the probability of the candidate nodes is lower than the defined threshold, the detector will flag it as an unknown communication sequence (Matousek et al 2020).…”
Section: Anomaly Detection In Scada Communication Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Type of Attack [36], [48], [49], [52][53][54][55][56][57][58], [62] False data injection (FDI) attacks [59], [60], [62], [75] [65] Denial-of-service attacks (DoS) [73], [75] Distributed Denial of Service attack [68] Man-in-the-middle attack [44], [66], [67] Malware Attack [36], [60], [71] Code injection [73] Dynamic load altering attacks (D-LAA) [34], [37], [38], [75] unauthorized access to systems [45], [62] State Estimation attack [65] Eavesdropping, Phishing attacks & kill Disk attacks. [59], [63] Misrepresentation of values and Price manipulation attack [66], [70] Coordinated attacks Below, we discuss these major cyber incidents identified in Table 3 and their related Countermeasures.…”
Section: Author/authorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where this Plant is under normal or under attack situations. [67] Also suggested that when such an attack is target towards Industrial Control System (ICS), system monitoring monitors ICS/SCADA protocols about I.P. flows extended to application layer data obtained from ICS packet headers.…”
Section: Man-in-the-middle Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%