Definition of the problem Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role. Arguments I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six 'life and death' matters. Conclusion My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life's meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.