Fleet Restructuring, Rent Generation, and the Design of Individual Fishing Quota Programs: Empirical Evidence from the Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery

LIAN, CARL; Singh, Rajesh; WENINGER, QUINN

doi:10.1086/mre.24.4.42629661

Cited by 27 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…The most long-standing prediction about ITQs has been that transferable property rights to harvest will induce changes along the extensive margin via consolidation of quota among a smaller number of more efficient vessels [1,2,3,4]. This prediction has been substantiated by experience as ITQ programs have universally led to a reduced number of vessels-an outcome consistent with empirical findings of over-capitalized fisheries and pre-ITQ vessels operating under increasing returns to scale.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 52%

Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

Reimer

Abbott²,

Wilen

2014

Land Economics

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Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along the both the extensive marginvia consolidation of quota among fewer vessels-and the intensive margin, as harvesters adjust their behavior to ITQ incentives. We use ITQ introduction in the Bering Sea crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins. We embed an empirically calibrated structural model of the harvesting process into a sector-level model, allowing us to experimentally "unravel" the ITQ treatment. We show that the magnitude and source of rent generation under ITQs critically depends on the manner and degree of rent dissipation before ITQs are implemented.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 52%

Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

Reimer

Abbott²,

Wilen

2014

Land Economics

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“…We calculated revenue from the 2005 price per ton for each species (NOAA 2010). We used data from Lian et al (2010) to consider three scenarios of the cost of groundfish harvesting (each increment 1% of total biomass): US$3, $5, and $7 million. The assumption of constant costs proportional to harvest rate is simplistic, but it provides a basis for evaluating the economic consequences of different levels of fishing mortality.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining Trade‐Offs among Conservation, Profitability, and Food Security in the California Current Bottom‐Trawl Fishery

Hilborn

Stewart

Branch

et al. 2012

Conservation Biology

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Although it is recognized that marine wild-capture fisheries are an important source of food for much of the world, the cost of sustainable capture fisheries to species diversity is uncertain, and it is often questioned whether industrial fisheries can be managed sustainably. We evaluated the trade-off among sustainable food production, profitability, and conservation objectives in the groundfish bottom-trawl fishery off the U.S. West Coast, where depletion (i.e., reduction in abundance) of six rockfish species (Sebastes) is of particular concern. Trade-offs are inherent in this multispecies fishery because there is limited capacity to target species individually. From population models and catch of 34 stocks of bottom fish, we calculated the relation between harvest rate, long-term yield (i.e., total weight of fish caught), profit, and depletion of each species. In our models, annual ecosystem-wide yield from all 34 stocks was maximized with an overall 5.4% harvest rate, but profit was maximized at a 2.8% harvest rate. When we reduced harvest rates to the level (2.2% harvest rate) at which no stocks collapsed (<10% of unfished levels), biomass harvested was 76% of the maximum sustainable yield and profit 89% of maximum. A harvest rate under which no stocks fell below the biomass that produced maximum sustainable yield (1% harvest rate), resulted in 45% of potential yield and 67% of potential profit. Major reductions in catch in the late 1990s led to increase in the biomass of the most depleted stocks, but this rebuilding resulted in the loss of >30% of total sustainable yield, whereas yield lost from stock depletion was 3% of total sustainable yield. There are clear conservation benefits to lower harvest rates, but avoiding overfishing of all stocks in a multispecies fishery carries a substantial cost in terms of lost yield and profit.

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“…Economists have focused their empirical attention on the economic and biological consequences of catch share programs for the target fisheries. Evidence for economic efficiency gains is strong-from fishery case studies, ex-ante empirical analyses, and individual fishing quota market data (Weninger 1998;NRC 1999;Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000;Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr 2005;Lian, Singh, and Weninger 2009). There is still debate about whether catch shares improve biological outcomes in the target fishery, i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillovers in Regional Fisheries Management: Do Catch Shares Cause Leakage?

Cunningham

Bennear

2014

SSRN Journal

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Regional councils manage United States fisheries. Fishermen can participate in fisheries managed by multiple councils, and effort controls in one region could lead to effort leakage into another. Theoretical modeling demonstrates that positive, negative, and no leakage are possible. Using difference-in-differences, we test for leakage across regional boundaries for a catch share program in New England and find evidence that the New England groundfish sector program caused spillover into adjacent Mid-Atlantic fisheries. Aggregate Mid-Atlantic harvest volume increased among sector members after the policy change. We find leakage in individual fisheries with similar gear and high market substitutability with sector species.JEL Codes: Q22, Q28, H73

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Fleet Restructuring, Rent Generation, and the Design of Individual Fishing Quota Programs: Empirical Evidence from the Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery

Cited by 27 publications

References 10 publications

Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

Defining Trade‐Offs among Conservation, Profitability, and Food Security in the California Current Bottom‐Trawl Fishery

Spillovers in Regional Fisheries Management: Do Catch Shares Cause Leakage?

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