FISSC: A Fault Injection and Simulation Secure Collection

Abstract

Applications in secure components (such as smartcards, mobile phones or secure dongles) must be hardened against fault injection to guarantee security even in the presence of a malicious fault. Crafting applications robust against fault injection is an open problem for all actors of the secure application development life cycle, which prompted the development of many simulation tools. A major difficulty for these tools is the absence of representative codes, criteria and metrics to evaluate or compare obtained results. We present FISSC, the first public code collection dedicated to the analysis of code robustness against fault injection attacks. FISSC provides a framework of various robust code implementations and an approach for comparing tools based on predefined attack scenarios.This work has been partially supported by the SERTIF project (ANR-14-ASTR-0003-01): http://sertif-projet.forge.imag.fr. This work has been partially supported by the LabEx PERSYVAL-Lab (ANR-11-LABX-0025).

Formally verified software countermeasures for control-flow integrity of smart card C code

“…The weakness detection and code securing processes can be performed at different code levels: source code [6], any intermediate code such as during the compilation process [7,8], or binary code [9]. Working at the assembly or binary code level seems to be the most adapted level when considering physical faults.…”

“…We consider control-flow disruption, which is a harmful consequence of fault attacks that encompass both instruction skip faults and larger jumps that are easily performed with physical fault injection means. Such control-flow disruption enables an attacker to retrieve secret keys [15,3], bypass certain implemented countermeasures [6], or obtain certain unauthorized privileges [16,17]. Our approach, which is supported by tools and is illustrated in Figure 1, enables 1) the automatic detection of the weaknesses of native C programs to be embedded into a secure element (weakness detection is performed at the source code level and considers attacks that disrupt the control flow) and 2) the automatic injection of formally verified countermeasures at the granularity of single C statements.…”

“…As the previous ones, they have been formally verified. New experiments were conducted on the FISSC benchmark [6] (two versions of the VerifyPIN code), at both the C code and the assembly code level.…”

An automated and scalable formal process for detecting fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries

“…This fault model corresponds to targeted attacks that attempt to bypass code, or significantly disrupt the control flow. 18,19 Note that this is a superset of other faults that may target the same bits of the target address. and Xoring the left word to the right word.…”

“…In both cases, the fault model simulates any possible change to the jump target address. This fault model corresponds to targeted attacks that attempt to bypass code, or significantly disrupt the control flow . Note that this is a superset of other faults that may target the same bits of the target address.…”