Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis 2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_8
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Fiscal Councils: Threat or Opportunity for Democracy in the Post-Crisis Economic and Monetary Union?

Abstract: the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific … Show more

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“…For example, the European Commission (2017) considered the proximity to the Government of the Belgian and the German IFIs as problematic from the perspective of their independence. Similarly, the clash between the Spanish IFI and the Government, accused to filter the information transmitted by the competent administrations to the fiscal council (Fasone and Fromage 2017), shows the attempt of the Executive to curb the IFI’s activity following the “agent model”.…”
Section: The Heterogeneous Institutional Embedding Of National Fiscal Councils In the Emumentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, the European Commission (2017) considered the proximity to the Government of the Belgian and the German IFIs as problematic from the perspective of their independence. Similarly, the clash between the Spanish IFI and the Government, accused to filter the information transmitted by the competent administrations to the fiscal council (Fasone and Fromage 2017), shows the attempt of the Executive to curb the IFI’s activity following the “agent model”.…”
Section: The Heterogeneous Institutional Embedding Of National Fiscal Councils In the Emumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, almost every critical opinion of the HCFP has been used by parliamentary minorities to challenge the validity of the annual Budget Act, of the Financial Act and of the Act to finance the social security system in front of the French Constitutional Council, claiming that a violation of the principle of budgetary sincerity had occurred. Although the IFI’s opinions have never formed the standard for the annulment of any of the contested provisions, they trigger a lively parliamentary and public debate and are expressly mentioned in the French constitutional case law (Fasone and Fromage 2017).…”
Section: The Heterogeneous Institutional Embedding Of National Fiscal Councils In the Emumentioning
confidence: 99%