2013
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12035
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First‐Price Sealed‐Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions

Abstract: This article compares whether the first-price sealed-bid tender or the ascending English open auction generates higher revenue for the seller. Using a unique set of data for land sales and accounting for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, our results show that the first-price sealed-bid tender generates a lower land price, in the range of 1.2-9.6%, than the English open auction. Our results validate the theoretical prediction that open auctions result in higher prices because bid… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
(79 reference statements)
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“…As a result, allowing bidders to learn about others’ valuations (signals) in an auction can make the bidders more comfortable with their own assessments and may lead them to bid less cautiously (Klemperer ). Using land auction data in Singapore, Chow and Ooi () support the affiliated value theory in common value open auctions. They find that bidders bid aggressively in open auctions by observing other bidders’ information.…”
Section: Animal Spirits and Auctionmentioning
confidence: 86%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As a result, allowing bidders to learn about others’ valuations (signals) in an auction can make the bidders more comfortable with their own assessments and may lead them to bid less cautiously (Klemperer ). Using land auction data in Singapore, Chow and Ooi () support the affiliated value theory in common value open auctions. They find that bidders bid aggressively in open auctions by observing other bidders’ information.…”
Section: Animal Spirits and Auctionmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…In our case, we regard yt as the auction sales as a percentage of total number of houses sold at time t motivated by auction literature as well as by Gan (), Chow and Ooi () and Dong and Sing () as discussed earlier. However, we also use price‐to‐rent ratio, which gives us an opportunity to compare the results from the two series and to gain more insight into the relevance and relationship of animal spirits to a fundamental‐based price measure in the formation of bubbles in the New Zealand property market.…”
Section: Empirical Estimation Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Of the studies that have addressed auctions of non-distressed properties, a large fraction has focused on the preference between auctions versus negotiated sales with respect to sales revenues (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992;Lusht, 1996;Quan, 2002;Stevenson et al 2010;Qu and Liu, 2012;Gan, 2013;Haurin et al, 2013;and Chow et al, 2015). Other topics that have been analyzed are comparison between auction methods with respect to revenue maximization (Chow and Ooi, 2014), determinants of sale probability (Ong et al, 2005;Stevenson and Young, 2015), buyer's remorse and the winner's curse (Kim, 1989;Tse et al, Auction strategies 2011) and the role of competition in form of the number of bidders attending the auction (Hungria-Gunnelin, 2013).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Auctions with economic restrictions that fine those bidders that do not take the item are more beneficial than those of first-price sealed-bid [11]. Also, a comparison in an auction of farms concluding that the English auction offers a 4% higher profits for the seller than the first-price sealed-bid [12].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%