First price auctions with resale

Gupta, Michèle; Lebrun, Bernard

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00063-4

Cited by 73 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…We further assume that this cost is small, and is hence normalized to be zero. 6 Gupta and Lebrun (1999) …”

Section: Equilibrium Characterizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adapting the proof in Gal et al (2007), we can establish the following proposition. 8 Proposition 1 There is a unique solution,C(·), to the following differential equation system, which characterizes the entry equilibrium when resale is absent:…”

Section: Entry Without Resalementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly to the benchmark case without resale, to demonstrate 8 The assumption that h(η, v) is continuously differentiable is needed in the proof.…”

Section: Entry With Resalementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Auctions with entry and resale

Xu¹,

Levin²,

Ye³

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…We further assume that this cost is small, and is hence normalized to be zero. 6 Gupta and Lebrun (1999) …”

Section: Equilibrium Characterizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Entry Without Resalementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Auctions with entry and resale

Xu¹,

Levin²,

Ye³

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Haile (1999Haile ( , 2000Haile ( , 2001Haile ( , 2003, Gupta and Lebrun (1999), Hafalir and Krishna (2008), Zheng (2002), Garratt and Tröger (2006)). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The literature on auctions with resale provides six main reasons for resale: (i) New information regarding the values of objects arrives after the auctions (see Haile (1999Haile ( , 2000Haile ( , 2001Haile ( , 2003 and Gupta and Lebrun (1999)), (ii) new buyers arrive after the auction is over (Haile (1999)), (iii) asymmetry in the auction may lead to inefficient allocation (Zheng (2002); Hafalir and Krishna (2008)), (iv) presence of speculators in the auction (Garratt and Tröger (2006);Pagnozzi (2007Pagnozzi ( , 2009Pagnozzi ( , 2010), (v) coordination on collusive outcome (Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009)), and (vi) misperception of resale markets (Georganas (2011)). Our setup is closest to the third type because a multi-object auction setting with complementarities provides a natural asymmetry in terms of demand of bidders and therefore may lead to inefficient allocation under different formats.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment

Filiz‐Ozbay

Lopez-Vargas

Özbay

2015

Games and Economic Behavior

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Abstract. We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single-or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility. Our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case. However, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment.Preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format. (JEL D44, C72, C91)

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Exclusive Dealing through Resellers in Auctions with Stochastic Bidder Participation

Bose

Deltas

2002

Southern Economic Journal

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This paper demonstrates that a seller prefers to exclude final consumers from an auction and sell only to resellers when these resellers can gain access, at a cost, to a sufficiently bigger market than the seller himself. The intuition is that resellers recoup their expenses for marketing the item by reselling it to final consumers. If some consumers participate in the first auction and are outbid by the resellers, then their values for the item are relatively low. Outbidding part of their customer base is “bad news” for the resellers, and this depresses their bids when consumers compete with them. The socially optimal and revenue‐maximizing choices of auction format may not coincide: Restricting participation of consumers may be socially optimal but privately suboptimal and vice‐versa. The results suggest that (i) the exclusion of final consumers in some auctions may not be driven by transaction cost considerations, and (ii) sellers should not necessarily sell directly to consumers, even though new technologies allow them to do so at essentially zero cost, unless they can access a sufficiently large portion of the market.

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First price auctions with resale

Cited by 73 publications

References 5 publications

Auctions with entry and resale

Auctions with entry and resale

Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment

Exclusive Dealing through Resellers in Auctions with Stochastic Bidder Participation

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