First-Person Authority and Radical Interpretation

Picardi, Eva

doi:10.1515/9783110886504.197

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…In what follows, I will first introduce and criticize a reading of Davidson's explanation of the meaning‐asymmetry, which construes it as essentially relying on his remarks on disquotational specifications of meaning. This reading has been offered by a majority of the commentators on Davidson's account, such as Wright (2001, 348–50), Thöle (1993), Picardi (1993), Beisecker (2003), and Hacker (1997). I call it the “Disquotational Explanation” and will argue that not only is such an explanation implausible in general, but Davidson himself has argued against it.…”

Section: Davidson On Self‐knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation

Khani¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of selfknowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson's account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the "Disquotational Explanation." It has also been claimed that Davidson's account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the "Externalist Explanation." I will argue that not only are these explanations of self-knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self-knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson's official and independent account of self-knowledge, that is, his "Transcendental Explanation." I will defend this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by William Child.

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Section: Davidson On Self‐knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation

Khani¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“… 19 The ‘Disquotational Explanation’ has been attributed to Davidson by Beisecker (2003), Hacker (1997), Picardi (1993), Thöle (1993), and Wright (2001, pp. 348–350).…”

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confidence: 99%

Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account

Khani

2021

Dialogue

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I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.

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“…12 12 Eva Picardi, who accepts the claim I am calling ‘expressivist’, takes it to show that ‘I believe that p’ no more attributes a belief than does ‘p’ alone. Consequently, she reasons, there can be no such thing as self‐attribution and, a fortiori , no such thing as authoritative self‐attribution (Picardi, 1993, p. 209). Davidson rightly responds that ‘I believe that p’ and ‘p’ will not have the same truth‐conditions and, so, even when ‘I believe that p’ expresses the belief that p, it may still be used to make a self‐attribution (Davidson, 1993a, p. 211).…”

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confidence: 99%