First end‐to‐end PQC protected DPU‐to‐DPU communications

Aguilera, A. Cano; Clemente, X. Arnal i; Lawo, D.C.; Monroy, I. Tafur; Olmos, J.J. Vegas

doi:10.1049/ell2.12901

Electronics Letters

2023

DOI: 10.1049/ell2.12901

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First end‐to‐end PQC protected DPU‐to‐DPU communications

A. Cano Aguilera,

X. Arnal i Clemente,

D.C. Lawo

et al.

Abstract: The appearance of quantum computing in the short foreseeable future and its capability to break conventional cryptographic algorithms forces to change the paradigm of secure real‐time communications. Thus, government organizations, data centers, and enterprises among others are migrating their public key infrastructure towards using post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms in order to mitigate the security threats posed by quantum computers. This letter presents the first quantum resilient secure end‐to‐end … Show more

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2024

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Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

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Challenges and opportunities on the horizon of post-quantum cryptography

Rawal,

Curry

2024

APL Quantum

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Large quantum computers have the potential to break many cryptographic systems, e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman, Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and the elliptical curve cryptosystem. The Department of Defense (DoD) is aware of this threat, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology is preparing a set of approved encryption and signature schemes that are not susceptible to these attacks by quantum computers, the so-called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The task of substituting older encryption and signature schemes raises a number of questions, to which there are not yet clear answers. In this research, we investigate the transition to PQC on existing networks, explain the approved PQC schemes, describe the likely path to an adaptation of PQC, and offer forward guidance on challenges and threats that may be encountered in the process of transition to PQC. This paper discusses the impacts of the new PQC schemes on network performance and speculates on possible side-channel attacks on the new encryption scheme. This paper offers hardware/software solutions based on the Split-protocol.

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Challenges and opportunities on the horizon of post-quantum cryptography

Rawal,

Curry

2024

APL Quantum

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Falcon/Kyber and Dilithium/Kyber Network Stack on Nvidia’s Data Processing Unit Platform

Lawo,

Frantz,

Aguilera

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

Self Cite

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Commercially available quantum computers are expected to reshape the world in the near future. They are said to break conventional cryptographic security mechanisms that are deeply embedded in our today's communication. Symmetric cryptography, such as AES, will withstand quantum attacks as long as the key sizes are doubled compared to today's key lengths. Asymmetric cryptographic procedures, e.g. RSA, however are broken. It is therefore necessary to change the way we assure our privacy by adopting and moving towards post-quantum cryptography (PQC) principles. In this work, we benchmark three PQC algorithms, Falcon, Dilithium, and Kyber. Moreover, we present an implementation of a PQC stack consisting of the algorithms Dilithium/Kyber and Falcon/Kyber which use hardware accelerators for some key functions and evaluate their performance and resource utilization. Regarding a classic server-client model, the computational load of the Dilithium/Kyber stack is distributed more equally among server and client. The stack Falcon/Kyber biases the computational challenges towards the server, hence relieving the client of performing costly operations. We found that Dilithium's advantage over Falcon is that Dilithium's execution is faster while the workload to be performed is distributed equally among client and server, whereas Falcon's advantage over Dilithium lies within the small signature sizes and the unequally distributed computational tasks. In a client server model with a performance limited client (i.e. Internet-of-Things -IoT -environments) Falcon could proof useful for it constrains the computational hard tasks to the server and leaves a minimal workload to the client. Furthermore, Falcon requires smaller bandwidth, making it a strong candidate for deep-edge or IoT applications.

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Wireless and Fiber-Based Post-Quantum-Cryptography-Secured IPsec Tunnel

Lawo,

Abu Bakar,

Cano Aguilera

et al. 2024

Future Internet

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In the near future, commercially accessible quantum computers are anticipated to revolutionize the world as we know it. These advanced machines are predicted to render traditional cryptographic security measures, deeply ingrained in contemporary communication, obsolete. While symmetric cryptography methods like AES can withstand quantum assaults if key sizes are doubled compared to current standards, asymmetric cryptographic techniques, such as RSA, are vulnerable to compromise. Consequently, there is a pressing need to transition towards post-quantum cryptography (PQC) principles in order to safeguard our privacy effectively. A challenge is to include PQC into existing protocols and thus into the existing communication structure. In this work, we report on the first experimental IPsec tunnel secured by the PQC algorithms Falcon, Dilithium, and Kyber. We deploy our IPsec tunnel in two scenarios. The first scenario represents a high-performance data center environment where many machines are interconnected via high-speed networks. We achieve an IPsec tunnel with an AES-256 GCM encrypted east–west throughput of 100 Gbit/s line rate. The second scenario shows an IPsec tunnel between a wireless NVIDIA Jetson and the cloud that achieves a 0.486 Gbit/s AES-256 GCM encrypted north–south throughput. This case represents a mobile device that communicates securely with applications running in the cloud.

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First end‐to‐end PQC protected DPU‐to‐DPU communications

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

Challenges and opportunities on the horizon of post-quantum cryptography

Challenges and opportunities on the horizon of post-quantum cryptography

Falcon/Kyber and Dilithium/Kyber Network Stack on Nvidia’s Data Processing Unit Platform

Wireless and Fiber-Based Post-Quantum-Cryptography-Secured IPsec Tunnel

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