Fire-induced loss of nuclear power plant safety functions

Gallucci, Raymond Hv; Hockenbury, R.W.

doi:10.1016/0029-5493(81)90039-x

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…9 Fire PRA techniques for NPPs originated as early as 1975, when an analysis of the potential frequency for core damage due to the BF-1 fire was incorporated into Appendix XI, ''Analysis of Comments on the Draft WASH-1400 Report,'' of the ''Reactor Safety Study'' (WASH-1400) [27]. Other early analyses followed, especially: (1) UCLA-ENG-7748, ''Some Aspects of the Fire Hazard in Nuclear Power Plants;'' (2) GA-A15402, a Fire PRA for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor by General Atomic Co.; (3) ''FireInduced Loss of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Functions,'' based on a doctoral thesis at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and (4) the then state-of-the-art PRAs for the Indian Point and Zion NPPs, which performed fire modeling using the COMPBRN computer code developed at the University of California at Los Angeles [28][29][30][31][32][33].…”

Section: Trust But Verifymentioning

confidence: 99%

Thirty-three Years of Regulating Fire Protection at Commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Dousing the Flames of Controversy**

Gallucci

2008

Fire Technol

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This article focuses on what have been, and may continue to be, the more controversial aspects of fires at commercial nuclear power plants regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Examining what has transpired in fire protection regulation since the 1975 fire at Browns Ferry Unit 1, which first focused attention on the potential hazard of fire at commercial nuclear power plants, we offer a personal perspective as to whether or not the ''the flames of controversy'' have been ''doused.'' We show that significant progress has been made while speculating whether these ''flames'' may ever truly be extinguished, or only kept under control. No core damage accident has ever occurred at a commercial nuclear power plant due to fire.

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Section: Trust But Verifymentioning

confidence: 99%

Thirty-three Years of Regulating Fire Protection at Commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Dousing the Flames of Controversy**

Gallucci

2008

Fire Technol

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“…It is written by a former employee of the NRC (views do not nor ever did represent an official position), the first to receive a PhD on a thesis specifically related to fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear plants, and later hired in 2003 as the expert in fire PRA for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). [2,3] He participated in the NFPA-805 program from the start in 2005 until mid-2014. The perspectives here cover that time period, with some extended time specific to issues that the interested reader can find detailed in reference [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk-Deformed Regulation: What Went Wrong with NFPA 805

Gallucci¹

2018

Civ Eng J

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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 was incorporated into Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations to allow commercial nuclear plants to transition their existing, deterministic fire protection licensing bases to ones that are “performance-based and risk-informed.” Both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the commercial reactor industry championed this major leap forward in “risk-informed regulation.” However, hidden behind all the “success” are compromises and manipulations that were necessary to make this “work,” as revealed in this article. It is written by a former employee of the NRC (views do not nor ever did represent an official position), the first to receive a PhD on a thesis specifically related to fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear plants, and later hired in 2003 as the expert in fire PRA for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). He participated in the NFPA-805 program from the start in 2005 until mid-2014. The perspectives here cover that time period, with some extended time specific to issues that the interested reader can find detailed in “Risk-Deformed Regulation: What Went Wrong with NFPA 805” http://vixra.org/pdf/ (access latest version of entry 1805.0403).NFPA 805 will have been “successful” in that adopting plants are as safe as or safer than before, at a minimum having at least become more knowledgeable of potential safety weaknesses. Plants that made effective changes will be safer than before, although “effective” conveys that some changes only may have “seemingly” reduced risk. If such changes were prompted by questionable risk-reduction credits such as those cited later in this paper, then perhaps actual risk-reduction changes that could have been made were not. At worst, the plant merely missed an opportunity to become “safer,” a consequence of the problems with “risk-deformed regulation.”

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Methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of fire protection systems in nuclear power plants

Levinson

Yeater

1983

Nuclear Engineering and Design

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Fire-induced loss of nuclear power plant safety functions

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Thirty-three Years of Regulating Fire Protection at Commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Dousing the Flames of Controversy**

Thirty-three Years of Regulating Fire Protection at Commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Dousing the Flames of Controversy**

Risk-Deformed Regulation: What Went Wrong with NFPA 805

Methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of fire protection systems in nuclear power plants

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