Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory

Currás-Lorenzo, Guillermo; Navarrete, Álvaro; Pereira, Margarida; Tamaki, Kiyoshi

doi:10.1103/physreva.104.012406

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In [32] it is shown how to use Eq. (A1) to derive an upper bound on the sum of conditional probabilities, namely…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…except with probability . Below we include for completeness the remaining bounds that we use in this work [31,32], being all of them held except with probability . In particular, an upper bound on the actual value Λ N is given by KU N, (S) :=…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…is the probability that Alice selects the setting a, sends a n-photon pulse, and Bob observes the outcome b ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X , 1 X } conditioned on all the information available up to the u-th round, and where Π a = |R a R a | A1 . We note that Γ u,ref 1 can always be written as a function of the yields Y u,ref a,b,n independently on the set of reference states that we choose (i.e., even if we consider the case of flawed states) given that they lie in a qubit space [21,32].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks

Navarrete¹,

Curty²

2022

Preprint

Self Cite

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Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light to learn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent works consider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKD unless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derive finite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence of THAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitute an important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory and practice in QKD.

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“…In [32] it is shown how to use Eq. (A1) to derive an upper bound on the sum of conditional probabilities, namely…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks

Navarrete¹,

Curty²

2022

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…IV C, we apply Kato's inequality to upper-bound S 3 in Eq. (40). We remark that the security proof is valid even if we instead use Azuma's inequality to bound S 3 , and in this case, the final expression of N U ph in Eq.…”

Section: Comparisons Of Key Rates With Azuma's and Kato's Inequalitiesmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…On the other hand, Kato's inequality is the recently found novel concentration inequality that always gives a tighter bound than Azuma's inequality and is employed in recent finite-key analyses [20,[39][40][41]]. Kato's inequality has a significant advantage over Azuma's one especially when the target sum of conditional expectations is much smaller than the number of trials.…”

Section: Abmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finite-key security analysis of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Mizutani¹,

Takeuchi²,

Tamaki³

2023

Preprint

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Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the major QKD protocols that can be implemented with a simple setup using a laser source and a passive detection unit. Recently, an information-theoretic security proof of this protocol has been established in [npj Quant. Inf. 5, 87 (2019)] assuming the infinitely large number of emitted pulses. To implement the DPS protocol in a real-life world, it is indispensable to analyze the security with the finite number of emitted pulses. The extension of the security proof to the finite-size regime requires the accommodation of the statistical fluctuations to determine the amount of privacy amplification. In doing so, Azuma's inequality is often employed, but unfortunately we show that in the case of the DPS protocol, this results in a substantially low key rate. This low key rate is due to a loose estimation of the sum of probabilities regarding three-photon emission whose probability of occurrence is very small. The main contribution of our work is to show that this obstacle can be overcome by exploiting the recently found novel concentration inequality, Kato's inequality. As a result, the key rate of the DPS protocol is drastically improved. For instance, assuming typical experimental parameters, a 3 Mbit secret key can be generated over 77 km for 8.3 hours, which shows the feasibility of DPS QKD under a realistic setup.

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Implementation Security in Quantum Key Distribution

Zapatero,

Navarrete,

Curty

2024

Adv Quantum Tech

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Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory

Abstract: This is a repository copy of Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory.

Cited by 9 publications

References 34 publications

Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks

Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks

Finite-key security analysis of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Implementation Security in Quantum Key Distribution

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