2007
DOI: 10.1109/acsac.2007.4413012
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Fine-Grained Information Flow Analysis and Enforcement in a Java Virtual Machine

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Cited by 9 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, a static analysis approach could be problematic in a browser setting, where the analysis might need to be re-run on each browser client before program execution [Vogt et al 2007]. Finally, dynamic analysis also allows for somewhat more flexibility in applying policies, and can allow us to hot-swap information flow policies [Chandra and Franz 2007].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Furthermore, a static analysis approach could be problematic in a browser setting, where the analysis might need to be re-run on each browser client before program execution [Vogt et al 2007]. Finally, dynamic analysis also allows for somewhat more flexibility in applying policies, and can allow us to hot-swap information flow policies [Chandra and Franz 2007].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The non-interference property is proved in much richer context with constructs of pointers and mutable state, private fields and class-based visibility, dynamic binding and inheritance, casts and type tests, and mutually recursive classes and methods. Bernardeschi and et al [8] use type-based abstract interpretation (which is similar to bytecode verification) to prove information flow safety of Java bytecode. They, like Denning, handle implicit flows and make use of the immediate post-dominator relation to declassify the security label of the execution context.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chandra and Franz [3] propose to use a trusted multilevel security Java virtual machine (JVM). This special JVM is said to execute completely untrusted programs without the risk of producing invalid flows.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At run-time, the monitor records the execution trace 3 and it may require the computation of dynamic slices to deduce if flows to output channels are secure or not.…”
Section: Run-time Information Flow Monitoring Using Dynamic Slicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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