Financing bidders in takeover contests

Vladimirov, Vladimir

doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.002

Cited by 34 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 45 publications

(30 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Martynova and Renneboog (2009) also examine the determinants of debt financing likelihood in a sample of European M&A transactions. Vladimirov (2015) analyzes how the cost and source of finance in cash offers impact acquisition premium and acquisition outcome when acquirers face financial frictions. Differing from these previous studies, we investigate how the characteristics of M&A deals determine the cost of loan financing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Loan price in mergers and acquisitions

Gao

Hua

Khurshed

2021

Journal of Corporate Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Loan price in mergers and acquisitions

Gao

Hua

Khurshed

2021

Journal of Corporate Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Jing Zhang and Yongan Zhang (2011), based on the institutional background of post-non-tradable share period of China's capital markets, find that M&A performance of cash payment is higher than that of stock payment [3] . Vladimirov (2015) addresses that the acquirer will select stock payment in the acquisition process only when it lacks competitive funding storage. The endogeneity of payment determines that the stock payThe effect of different payment methods on M&A performance -An empirical analysis based on the panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market ment, which is generally considered relatively safe method of payment, in fact will not bring an advantage to M&A process [4] .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of different payment methods on M&A performance - An empirical analysis based on the panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market

Yuan

2016

SHS Web of Conferences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Aiming at studying the impact of different payment methods on M&A performance, this paper conducts empirical research using panel data of 2009--2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share Market. The results show that, the difference of payment terms does not have a significant impact on the M&A performance in the overall regression. Further grouping regression shows that, for enterprises of mature industry, if they use cash payment terms in the M&A activity, their shareholders' earning power is significantly lower than other enterprises, but the profitability is significantly lower, and if they use stock payment terms in the M&A activity, their operating capacity is significantly higher than other companies; for enterprises of growing industry, whether they use cash payment terms or not has no significant impact on the M&A performance, and if they use stock payment terms, the profitability is significantly higher than other enterprises; for enterprises of recession industry, the difference of payment methods does not affect the M&A performance.

show abstract

Challenging the payment effect in bank-financed takeovers

Fischer

2015

J Manag Control

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the context of bank-financed takeovers, I examine the influence of loans and their characteristics on the success of acquisitions. The unique setting of matched syndicated loans allows me to forego the regular assumption in academic literature of cash payment being equal to debt financing. Consequently, I am able to distinguish between the payment effect and the financing effect of an acquisition. My three main findings are: (i) Payment method is just an estimator of the debt proportion in takeovers. Although percentage of cash has significant explanatory power to account for the sources of financing, variation still remains. (ii) Controlling for the real financial structure renders the payment method insignificant. Hence, the well-known outperformance of cash payment around the announcement of a takeover might actually just be an outperformance of debt-financed takeovers. (iii) Bank-financed acquisitions are associated, on average, with positive abnormal returns for acquirers' stockholders. Higher bank involvements-approximated by greater deal leverage, higher loan costs, longer maturity, lower interest coverage, or no previous banking relationship-are signals for a more successful takeover.

show abstract

Financing bidders in takeover contests

Cited by 34 publications

References 45 publications

Loan price in mergers and acquisitions

Loan price in mergers and acquisitions

The effect of different payment methods on M&A performance - An empirical analysis based on the panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market

Challenging the payment effect in bank-financed takeovers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About