Financing and carbon emission reduction strategies of capital-constrained manufacturers in E-commerce supply chains

Qin, Jia; Fu, Haohuan; Wang, Ziping; Lei, Xia

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108271

Cited by 51 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…The European Union (EU) has also adopted ambitious new targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 and reach net zero emissions by 2050 [ 6 ]. To reduce carbon emissions, China, the EU, the United States, and many other countries have adopted and implemented many types of mechanisms, such as the cap-and-trade regulation [ 7 , 8 , 9 ]. In a cap-and-trade system, every firm is allocated a carbon emission quota by the government and can sell or buy additional and insufficient carbon credits in the carbon trading market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Supply Chain Competition on Firms’ Carbon Emission Reduction and Social Welfare under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Xue

Sun

2022

IJERPH

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In the carbon neutrality era, firms are facing increasingly intense environmental pressure and market competition. This paper considers two competitive supply chains with consumers’ low-carbon preference under the cap-and-trade regulation, each of which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. Considering competition or integration in vertical and horizontal directions, four different supply chain structures are modeled. By applying a game-theoretical approach, the equilibrium pricing, carbon emission reduction (CER) level, profit, and social welfare are obtained. Through comparison and analysis, the economic and environmental impacts of supply chain competition are explored. The results show that (1) the carbon quota acts as a kind of financial subsidy and brings direct economic profit to the supply chain, which cannot be used to incentivize the firm to invest in CER technology; (2) the HCVI strategy can bring the highest CER level, the most market demand, and social welfare among the four strategies; (3) for the enterprise and the government, it is recommended to take measures and enact policies to strengthen the vertical integration and horizontal competition between supply chains. Our study can guide firms on how to cope with increasingly fierce industry competition and environmental pressure by adjusting their operational decisions and supply chain structure.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Supply Chain Competition on Firms’ Carbon Emission Reduction and Social Welfare under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Xue

Sun

2022

IJERPH

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“…Qi et al [ 20 ] investigated joint decisions on emission reduction investment and order quantity under the conditional value at risk framework. Qin et al [ 21 ] explored the carbon emission reduction and financing strategies of capital-constrained manufacturers under the cap-and-trade scheme. Xu and Duan [ 22 ] examined the ‘greenness’ investment and pricing strategies with government subsidies and explored when to adopt blockchain technology.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Abatement Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Xue

Sun

Yao

2022

IJERPH

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In the era of sustainable development, reducing carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are gradually becoming a consensus for our society. This study explores firms’ incentive mechanisms for carbon emission abatement in a two-echelon supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation, where consumers exhibit low-carbon awareness. To boost the manufacturer’s motivation for abatement, the retailer can provide four incentive strategies, i.e., price-only (PO), cost-sharing (CS), revenue-sharing (RS), and both (cost and revenue) sharing (BS). The equilibrium decisions under the four incentive strategies are obtained by establishing and solving game models. A two-part tariff contract is also proposed to coordinate the low-carbon supply chain. Finally, through comparisons and analyses, we find that: (1) Consumers’ high low-carbon awareness can boost the manufacturer’s incentive for carbon emission abatement (CEA), thus increasing supply chain members’ profits. (2) It is more effective for the retailer to share its revenue to incentivize the manufacturer for abatement than to bear the investment cost of CEA. Thus, Strategy RS is better than Strategy CS and equivalent to Strategy BS. (3) The manufacturer and retailer have consistent incentive strategy preference under cap-and-trade regulation. Both firms prefer the incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level. (4) The incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level can also bring higher eco-social welfare under certain conditions.

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“…Yang et al [23] studied a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a bank, an e-commerce platform, and an online retailer, of which the bank is the leader. Qin et al [24] considered three financing modes of the manufacturer, including e-commerce platform financing, supplier credit and hybrid financing, and the manufacturer needs to make a decision on carbon emission reduction under cap-and-trade regulation. Wang et al [25] investigated the sales and financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer in a green platform supply chain, as well as carbon emission reduction decisions.…”

Section: Financial Research On E-commerce Platformmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are few studies on the financing difficulties of online green industries. Qin et al [24] and Wang et al [25] both studied the strategy choice of cooperative financing with multiple parties such as online retailers or platforms in the green decision-making process of capitalconstrained manufacturers. However, this only reflects a static decision in a specific situation.…”

Section: Research Gapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Innovation and Green Financing in Platform Supply Chain

Liu

Peng

2022

Sustainability

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In view of the financing dilemma of green innovation of manufacturers in the e-commerce supply chain, we build a strategy evolution game model between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms and describe the dynamic evolution law of manufacturers choosing green innovation and platforms choosing green financing. Combined with numerical simulation, the factors affecting green innovation and green financing decisions are analyzed and strategic suggestions are put forward. The conclusions are as follows: (1) There is a unique evolutionary equilibrium strategy for dynamic behavioral decision-making between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms; (2) Green innovation and green financing are beneficial to both players of the game; (3) Whether the platform provides green financing services for manufacturers is affected by factors such as commissions, additional benefits brought by green innovation or green financing, and financing amounts. This paper enriches the research on green strategies for e-commerce supply chains, provides suggestions for green innovation and financing cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and further promotes the green development of the manufacturing industry.

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Financing and carbon emission reduction strategies of capital-constrained manufacturers in E-commerce supply chains

Cited by 51 publications

References 46 publications

Impacts of Supply Chain Competition on Firms’ Carbon Emission Reduction and Social Welfare under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Impacts of Supply Chain Competition on Firms’ Carbon Emission Reduction and Social Welfare under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Incentive Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Abatement Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Innovation and Green Financing in Platform Supply Chain

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