2021
DOI: 10.1177/10245294211003274
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Financialization and state capitalism in Hungary after the Global Financial Crisis

Abstract: Whereas the active role of the state in steering financialization is consensual in advanced economies, the financialization of emerging market economies is usually examined through the prism of dependency: this downplays the domestic political functions of financialization and the agency of the state. With the consolidation of state capitalist regimes in the semi-periphery after the Global Financial Crisis, different interpretations emerged – some linking state capitalism with de-financialization, others with … Show more

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Cited by 36 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…First, the general cultural politics and policy of the Orbán-regime have been recently examined by several scholars (Kristóf, 2017;Barna et al, 2018;Bonet & Zamorano, 2020;Nagy & Szarvas, 2021). This article joins the thread in the literature that emphasizes how the regime's cultural politics should be studied as an integral part of its comprehensive restructuring of the internal and external dependencies from financial policy (Karas, 2022), to housing (Gagyi et al, 2021), from labor-relations (Meszmann & Fedyuk, 2020) to its integration into global value chains (Szabó & Jelinek, 2023). Altogether this shift can be described as a rise of state capitalism in which authoritarian measures serve capital accumulation and national cultural apparatuses of both elite and popular culture-such as the HAA or the subsidy of national pop music-are prioritized.…”
Section: Culture and State Formation In The Orbán Regimementioning
confidence: 88%
“…First, the general cultural politics and policy of the Orbán-regime have been recently examined by several scholars (Kristóf, 2017;Barna et al, 2018;Bonet & Zamorano, 2020;Nagy & Szarvas, 2021). This article joins the thread in the literature that emphasizes how the regime's cultural politics should be studied as an integral part of its comprehensive restructuring of the internal and external dependencies from financial policy (Karas, 2022), to housing (Gagyi et al, 2021), from labor-relations (Meszmann & Fedyuk, 2020) to its integration into global value chains (Szabó & Jelinek, 2023). Altogether this shift can be described as a rise of state capitalism in which authoritarian measures serve capital accumulation and national cultural apparatuses of both elite and popular culture-such as the HAA or the subsidy of national pop music-are prioritized.…”
Section: Culture and State Formation In The Orbán Regimementioning
confidence: 88%
“…In addition, some illiberal financial nationalists must influence the judiciary to stave off challenges to their policies. As Karas (2022) demonstrates, Hungary this process involved the Orbán government's creation of a "financial vertical" that consolidated state control over the central bank, credit provision, and domestic financial institutions. Persuasively arguing that having a subordinate position in the international financial system does not mean that domestic actors lack agency in confronting it, he shows that Orbán was able to turn Hungary's financialized system to his own political and economic ends.…”
Section: Policy Choice and Implementation: Constraints And Enablersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, although illiberal financial nationalism positions itself in opposition to the universalist claims of the international liberal order, it is also fundamentally shaped by its emergence from within that order. Just as financialization makes it possible to create a domestic "financial vertical" (Karas 2022), financial globalization and its institutions not only constrain the policy options of illiberal financial nationalists but also provide opportunities for them to draw on transnational financial resources and institutions to advance their nationalist cause. Illiberal financial nationalists must strategically deploy international relationships to benefit national insiders and their allies, and in fact successful financial nationalist strategies are often actively enabled by the liberal international institutions.…”
Section: Sources Of Financingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We, however, abstain from defining either Hungary, or Serbia (or China) as state capitalist regimes per se . Instead, following studies which describe the parallel neoliberal and protectionist nature of the Hungarian regime (Gerőcs, 2021; Karas, 2022), in which the state has a particular balancing role, we rather focus on the state capitalist modalities (Alami and Dixon, 2021) in both countries. That is, in accordance with the relational research program of ‘uneven and combined state capitalism’, we aim to analyse the dynamics and complexity of processes in which ‘the state’ and ‘the capital’ nexus (van Apeldoorn et al, 2012) are constantly reconfigured across a variety of scales.…”
Section: The Political Economy Of State Capitalism and Large-scale In...mentioning
confidence: 99%