Financial Resources and Product Market Development: Strategic Choice and Institutional Processes During China's Transition

Keister, Lisa A.; Jin, Lu

doi:10.1023/b:sofo.0000031981.07348.89

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Moreover, using the ultimate controller as an index also provides information about administrative levels of governments that control the listed companies. Through this index, we can reveal the discrepancies of interlocking networks of SOEs that are affiliated to different administrative levels (Keister and Lu 2004;Xia and Chen 2007;Yang et al 2010).…”

Section: Attribute Level Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property rights and the formation of interfirm networks: a network analysis of the interlocking directorates in China’s listed companies

2017

J. Chin. Sociol.

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Interfirm networks are one of the core modes of corporate governance. However, its formation mechanism is not clearly and adequately delineated. This article highlights the significance of property rights to the formation mechanism of interfirm networks. Using interlocking directorate data from Chinese listed companies during the years 2000-2010, we investigate the association between ownership and network formation, at both the individual attribute level and dyadic level. Results show that companies owned or controlled by the state are more likely to form interlocking networks, and these relations tend to emerge among companies that have identical ownership. The higher the administrative level to which state-controlled companies are affiliated, the more likely they are to form interlocking networks. Theories of economic efficiency also have some explanatory power regarding network formation.

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Section: Attribute Level Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property rights and the formation of interfirm networks: a network analysis of the interlocking directorates in China’s listed companies

2017

J. Chin. Sociol.

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“…State entities own large numbers of shares in private enterprises, and empirical evidence regarding the effect of this role is limited and mixed. There is evidence that central government funding decreases firms' participation in product markets (Keister and Lu 2004) and that government decentralization increases firm productivity (Dougherty and McGuckin 2008), suggesting support for an institutional approach. Yet other research shows that state ownership of privatized firms positively affects firm performance (Le and Buck 2011).…”

Section: Institutionalism Versus Corporatism: Empirical Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Transition: An Assessment of the State of the Field

Keister

Borelli

2012

Sociological Perspectives

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Large-scale changes in the global political and economic landscape have led to the proliferation of transition economies in recent decades. Market transition is the movement of an economy from state socialism toward market coordination of economic activity. In a redistributive state socialist economy, government officials collect and re-allocate goods according to a central plan. In a market economy, buyers and sellers bargain directly over price. The transformation of socialism into some form of a market economy realigns the interests of economic and political actors, introduces new actors such as private and hybrid firms, transforms labor relations, creates unique opportunities for economic participation and achievement, alters the personal characteristics and social relations that are recognized and rewarded, and otherwise changes incentives and reward structures. As a result, market transition alters the nature of social and economic behavior in a country often quite dramatically and rapidly.

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“…Loss-making firms were able to survive because government reallocated funds obtained from profitable firms to support them (Kornai, 1979(Kornai, , 1986a. Financial and product markets did begin to develop early in reform (Keister & Lu, 2004;Nee, 1989a), but both were slower to emerge than labor markets because of difficulties in converting the socialist price system (Lardy, 1989(Lardy, , 1998. However, some firms did begin to borrow from non-state sources early in reform, although both borrowers and lenders continued to rely on personal networks to reduce uncertainty in lending and exchange (Keister, 2002c(Keister, , 2004.…”

Section: The Origin Of Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%