Financiación y especialización productiva: el mercado de crédito malagueño a finales del sigloXVIII

Peña-Mir, José Luis

doi:10.1016/j.ihe.2016.06.001

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Similar results are obtained by Peña-Mir (2016, p. 136) in his analysis of agricultural obligation contracts in Malaga between 1779 and 1794: contracts supported with a general mortgage only—87.9 per cent of the sample—received an average amount of 1,685 r.v. and contracts supported with a special mortgage—12.1 per cent of the sample—received an average amount of 4,012 r.v.…”

supporting

confidence: 82%

“…29 This agro-export pattern was sustained by the city's trading houses and merchants who bought the commodities produced by the farmers and financed them periodically, receiving agricultural commodities in return. As a consequence of this situation, the city's notaries drew up a huge number of agricultural credit contracts (Peña-Mir 2016). The primacy of small properties in this area may also have determined the relevance of credit transactions (Bernal 1981, p. 283; Gámez Amián 1995, p. 152).…”

Section: Analysis Of the Databasementioning

confidence: 99%

“… 27 See Hoffman et al (2000, 2019) and Dermineur (2018, 2019) for France; De Luca (2013) and Lorenzini (2015) for Italy; Costa et al (2014) for Portugal; Sola (2000), Peña-Mir (2016) and Carvajal (2018) for Spain; Levy (2012) for Mexico; Zegarra (2017a, 2017b) for Peru; and Wasserman (2018) for Argentina. In the Low Countries, although notaries were not so relevant, they nonetheless had an important role.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Well Were Creditors’ Rights Protected in Early Modern Spain? The Case of the Public Mortgage Registry in Malaga

Peña-Mir

2020

RHE / JILAEH

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New Institutional Economics treats early modern Spain as an example of a state whose political and contracting institutions hindered economic growth. However, the assumption that Spanish political institutions were predatory in this respect has been called into question. This paper challenges the idea that Spain was unable to develop sufficiently good contracting institutions, of which we know relatively little. Using data from Malaga's notarial credit market, I show that legal institutions facilitated contractual compliance in private financial transactions. Specifically, public mortgage registries, which had improved the registration of properties used as collateral since their creation in 1768, favoured the subscription of larger contracts. Furthermore, results suggest that registries could have contributed to the development of a more impersonal credit market.

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confidence: 82%

Section: Analysis Of the Databasementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Well Were Creditors’ Rights Protected in Early Modern Spain? The Case of the Public Mortgage Registry in Malaga

Peña-Mir

2020

RHE / JILAEH

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“…98 See Flandreau and Flores (2009). 99 On the capacity of such legal arrangements to protect against government predatory behavior, see Peña-Mir, (2019).…”

Section: ) Spanish Quicksilver Mortgage Loan 5% 1870mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century

Flandreau¹,

Pietrosanti²,

Schuster³

2021

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This paper explores the reasons why sovereign borrowers post collateral. Such behavior is paradoxical because conventional interpretations of collateral stress repossession of the assets pledged as the key to securing lenders against information asymmetries and moral hazard. However, repossession is generally difficult in the case of sovereign debt and in some cases impossible. Nevertheless, such sovereign “hypothecations” have a long history and are again becoming very popular today in developing countries. To explain sovereign collateralization, we emphasize an informational channel. Posting collateral produces information on opaque borrowers by displaying borrowers’ behavior and resources. We support this interpretation by examining the hypothecation “mania” of 1849-1875, when sovereigns borrowing in the London Stock Exchange pledged all kinds of intangible revenues. Yet, at that time, sovereign immunity fully protected both sovereigns and their assets and possessions. Still, we show that hypothecations significantly decreased the cost of sovereign debt. To explain how, we stress the pledges’ role in documenting sovereigns’ wealth and the management of revenue streams. Based on an exhaustive library of bond prospectuses collected from primary sources, matched with a panel of sovereign bond yields and an innovative measure of sovereign fiscal transparency, we show that collateral minutely described in debt covenants served to document and monitor sovereign resources and development prospects. Encasing this information in contracts written by lawyers served to certify the quality of the resulting data disclosure process, explaining investors’ readiness to pay a premium.

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“…The Spanish credit market was tied to trade, and although by the mid-19 th century industry was also a part of that, the countryside and its financial needs were not. At the end of the 18 th century, agrarian credit operated through a series of instruments adapted to a rural world characterised by the scarcity of capital (Peña-Mir 2016).…”

Section: Banknotes Deposits and The Palmer Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and the Palmer Rule in the Origins of Banking in Spain

Martel

2019

RHE / JILAEH

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This paper investigates the reasons why provincial issuing banks in Spain maintained high reserves in the 19th century and the effects this had. The introduction of banknotes into the economy meant that convertibility had to be guaranteed. If convertibility was respected, this gave banks a good reputation and made them reliable. The Palmer Rule was a control mechanism stating that a well-managed bank should keep one-third of its liabilities as cash in hand and two-thirds in securities. In Spain the banking system, constituted in the mid-19th century, was characterised by a plurality of issuing banks. Regulations required reserves only to secure notes, with no mention of reserve requirements for banks’ other types of liabilities. However, Spanish provincial banks of issue adopted the Palmer Rule. The Bank of Spain did not follow the same path.

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Financiación y especialización productiva: el mercado de crédito malagueño a finales del sigloXVIII

Cited by 5 publications

References 7 publications

How Well Were Creditors’ Rights Protected in Early Modern Spain? The Case of the Public Mortgage Registry in Malaga

How Well Were Creditors’ Rights Protected in Early Modern Spain? The Case of the Public Mortgage Registry in Malaga

Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century

Reputation and the Palmer Rule in the Origins of Banking in Spain

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