Finance, technology and disruption

Abstract

In this paper, we assess how recent technology advances have changed the way we coordinate. After a brief discussion of the common challenges to effective coordination, we highlight some important implications of technology on addressing informational and behavioral frictions. We focus on discussing the effects of three specific technology developments including artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and blockchain, on the choice of coordination modes. We argue that technology is shifting the boundaries between firms and markets and is opening the door to new research directions.

Understanding China’s fintech sector: development, impacts and risks

“…She discovers that adoption of mobile payment would significantly increase a farmer's probability of becoming an informal business owner in the following period and would also markedly raise their income. An and Rau (2020), Momtaz (2020) and Zhao et al (2020) emphasize the innovativeness of incorporating blockchain and smart contracts in fundraising of projects yet to be developed through technology advances such as ICOs.…”

“…There are also some more general concerns in this industry. These include increasing threats to privacy, investor protection, information monopoly and access inequality as well (Frost et al 2019;An and Rau 2020;Zhao et al 2020). In many fintech business models, data sharing is essential and critical, which makes it very hard to protect privacy.…”

Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment

“…Consistent with Liu et al (2017), for example, we find that firms managed or owned by the state (i.e., the CPC) experience weaker stock market reactions immediately after the discipline revisions, relative to non-state-owned counterparts. This paper also speaks to the broad literature on law and finance (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998 and the recent literature that studies the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign on various economic and firm outcomes (Lin et al, 2016;Pan and Tian, 2017;Xu and Yano, 2017;Zhang, 2018;Wang et al, 2018;Gan and Xu, 2019;An et al, 2019;Hope et al, 2020). While these literatures tend to focus on a single dimension of bureaucrats' misbehaviour, our article studies the general incentive scheme within bureaucratic organisations.…”

Do Checks on Bureaucrats Improve Firm Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

“…Consistent with Liu et al (2017), for example, we find that firms managed or owned by the state (i.e., the CPC) experience weaker stock market reactions immediately after the discipline revisions, relative to non-state-owned counterparts. This paper also speaks to the broad literature on law and finance (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998 and the recent literature that studies the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign on various economic and firm outcomes (Lin et al, 2016;Pan and Tian, 2017;Xu and Yano, 2017;Zhang, 2018;Wang et al, 2018;Gan and Xu, 2019;An et al, 2019;Hope et al, 2020). While these literatures tend to focus on a single dimension of bureaucrats' misbehaviour, our article studies the general incentive scheme within bureaucratic organisations.…”

“…Alternatively, we can think of the tightening of party discipline as reducing the coordination costs between firms and government entities (Coase, 1937;An and Rau 2019).…”