Finance capital and the internal structure of the capitalist class in the United States

Soref, Michael; Zeitlin, Maurice; Mizruchi, Mark S.; Schwartz, Michael

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570841.003

Cited by 13 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…The decision to invite an executive of one firm to join the board of another typically presupposes some prior contact or association through which the board candidate became recognized as a person worthy of trust and able to provide useful advice and information. Previous research suggests that informal social interaction within exclusive metropolitan upper-class clubs plays an important role in the selection of outside corporate directors (Johnsen and Mintz 1989;Kono et al 1998;Useem 1984;Bonacich and Domhoff 1981;Soref 1976Soref , 1980Soref and Zeitlin 1987). Interpersonal ties created through membership on noncorporate boards of directors, kinship relations, or attendance at elite boarding schools and universities may also be important (Domhoff 1970(Domhoff , 1974Useem 1984).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Numerous researchers have identified large commercial banks as uniquely powerful institutions within the U.S. economy and the boards of these banks as providing important arenas for mediating the potentially conflicting interests of different economic sectors and forging a common strategy for corporate capital (Zeitlin 1974(Zeitlin , 1976Useem 1984;Mintz and Schwartz 1985;Bearden and Mintz 1987;Soref and Zeitlin 1987;Burris 1992). The largest U.S. commercial bank in 1980 was Citicorp, and its chairman, Walter B. Wriston, was an early supporter of John Connally for president.…”

Section: Interlocking Directorates As Extended Chains Of Indirect Tiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research has shown that the boards of large commercial banks and insurance companies provide important meeting grounds for some of the most influential and politically active members of the business community (Zeitlin 1974(Zeitlin , 1976Useem 1984;Mintz and Schwartz 1985;Bearden and Mintz 1987;Soref and Zeitlin 1987;Burris 1992). Hence, it is not surprising that joint participation within these exclusive "inner circles" might have consequences for political cohesion that other corporate interlocks do not.…”

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Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites

Burris¹

2005

American Journal of Sociology

282

161

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This study uses data on campaign contributions and methods of network analysis to investigate the significance of interlocking directorates for political cohesion among corporate elites. Using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression, the author shows that social ties formed through common membership on corporate boards contribute more to similarity of political behavior than commonalities of economic interests, such as those associated with operating in the same industry or the same geographic region. Moreover, the politically cohesive effects of directorship ties remain robust even as one moves several links down the chain of indirect ties that connect top corporate officers to one another. The study thus provides empirical support for the thesis that social networks among corporate elites facilitate political cohesion within the business community.Interlocking directorates among major U.S. corporations have been a focus of political and scholarly interest since the early 20th century. In recent decades, advances in computer technology and methods of network analysis have led to a virtual explosion of empirical studies of interlocking corporate directorates. Despite this extensive body of research, important questions remain as to the meaning and significance of director interlocks. As Mizruchi (1996) notes in his review of the literature, the question What do interlocks do? is perhaps the most crucial question confronting interlocks research. Critics of the early studies of director interlocks argued that this research was mostly descriptive and that the social, political, and economic effects of interlocking directorates were more often assumed than empirically demonstrated. Partly in response to this criticism, con-1 I wish to thank

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Interlocking Directorates As Extended Chains Of Indirect Tiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites

Burris¹

2005

American Journal of Sociology

282

161

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“…Such "finance capitalists" sit on the greatest number of corporate boards, of the largest firms, situated in core industries (Soref 1980). They are also more frequently than are other directors drawn from propertied families-families owning substantial blocks of stock in large firms-and are members of the "establishment,"as indicated by listings in the Social Register, social club memberships, and preparatory school attendance (Soref and Zeitlin 1987). Power structure researchers have studied director centrality and interlocking directorates extensively.…”

Section: Business Elite Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Friendly and Predatory Acquisition of Large U.S. Corporations in the 1960s: The Other Contested Terrain

Palmer¹,

Barber²,

Zhou³

et al. 1995

American Sociological Review

143

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The 1960s represent an important chapter in U.S. business history, partly because they ushered in a new tactic of corporate combination-the predatory takeover Predatory takeovers not only facilitate the restructuring of corporate enterprises, they also alter the internal structure of the business elite. We explore the factors that led large corporations to be acquired through friendly and predatory means in the 1960s. Consistent with the "embeddedness" perspective, our results indicate that the likelihood of acquisition during this period was influenced by a firm's position in the resource-dependence network of the economy as well as the positions of its managers and directors in the firm's ownership structure and in the social network of the business elite. Specifically, firms run by central managers and directors were less susceptible to predatory takeover-ownership relationships dominated over ties among the business elite. However, consistent with traditional economic accounts, our results suggest that in the 1960s undervaluation of a firm's assets, the ratio of its stock price to earnings, its performance, and its size also influenced the likelihood of acquisition. C :orporate acquisitions have important economic and political consequences. When one corporation acquires another, it often replaces the acquired firm's top managers with its own, thereby redistributing economic resources among business elites in society. It also sometimes transfers the administrative or productive assets of the acquired firm to its own headquarters or plants in different cities, thereby redistributing eco-nomic resources among cities, states, and regions. Insofar as the control of economic resources is related to political power, these transfers of control can shape the power structure of society as well.We focus on corporate acquisitions in the 1960s. The wave of acquisitions that peaked in 1968, the second largest such wave in U.S. history (eclipsed only by the 1980s wave), was notable for its industrial character. Vigorous enforcement of antitrust policy in this period, influenced by the Celler-Kefauver of Michigan provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. The ASR editor and three anonymous reviewers provided thorough and helpful comments. Finally, special thanks to Tony and Ricki for their inquisitive spirit and to Tom-the rocks do hit the water like broken glass. [The reviewers acknowledgd by the authors are American Sociological Review, 1995, Vol. 60 (August:469-499) 469 470 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW I Uncertainty based on resource dependence is only one type of uncertainty to which firms may be subject. We are not concerned with other sorts of uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty that stems from exogenous factors like changes in state economic policies that alter the supply and demand for, and thus the prices of, inputs and outputs).

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“…In the case of groups, Soref and Zeitlin (1987) argue that interlocking directorates tying together the major banks and top nonfinancial corporations take on a crucial political-economic role in integrating the simultaneous and potentially contradictory financial, industrial, and commercial interests of the wealthiest families, whose various investments span these ostensibly separate sectors. (60) For the purposes of this paper, we define a financial group as companies (financials and/or non-financials) linked by two or more directors.…”

Section: Neoliberal Entrenchment Of North Atlantic Capitalmentioning

confidence: 99%