Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract

In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's 'voluntarist' thesis, the idea-on Darwall's reading-that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non-voluntarily. He in turn defends a 'presuppositional' thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4-5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1-3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6-8).

Recognition, Freedom, and the Self in Fichte'sFoundations of Natural Right

“…But my way of stating and responding to the modal dilemma brings together a number of strands in FNR and shows the centrality of the modal dilemma for a number of core interpretative issues in FNR . I also believe that my paper shows that a number of the ambiguities in Fichte's position identified by Ware in his recent paper, ‘Fichte's Voluntarism’ (Ware ), in fact have their roots in problems with the transcendental argument Fichte presents in the first three theorems of FNR . I discuss the latter point in the penultimate section of the paper.…”

“…My interpretation, which as I discuss below is in an important sense non‐voluntarist, is thus able to account for one of the elements of Fichte's voluntarism stressed by Owen Ware: that there is a time prior to the recognition of a proto‐agent as a rational being during which her agency is merely problematic , and some further actions are required to establish normative relations of right. See Ware : 277.…”

“…In a recent paper in which he defends Fichte's voluntarism against Darwall's objections, Owen Ware argues in favour of preserving Fichte's distinction between problematic recognition of the other (i.e., the epistemic preconditions of summoning) and categorical recognition of the other, such as that which occurs in on‐going relations of right. See Ware : 263–6 and 277–8. Unlike Darwall, my interpretation accepts the importance of this distinction, so it is not clear that Ware would object to my kind of non‐voluntarism (at least not on the same grounds).…”

Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self‐Consciousness in Sections 1–3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right

“…4 I cite the page number from the English translation (Fichte 2000) followed by the page number from the sämmtliche Werke, hereafter SW (Fichte 1971). 5 See Nance (2012) and Ware (2010) discussed below in n.6. 6 At the dawn of the 21 st century, Fichte's argument is even undergoing a revival in the Anglo-American world in the work of Stephen Darwall.…”

“…Daniel Breazeale defends Fichte's distinction between right and morality against Darwall's criticisms in his article ‘The First Person Standpoint of Fichte's Ethics.’ (). For two further engagements with Darwall's interpretation of Fichte which address the controversy surrounding Fichte's dichotomy between right and morality in connection with Franks' most recent treatment of the Foundations see Ware () and Nance (). Centrally at issue in Nance's rich discussion is the so‐called ‘modal’ question, because it concerns the type of necessity Fichte intended to procure for his claim: in other words, did Fichte seek to show that standing in relations of right is transcendentally or metaphysically necessary, i.e.…”