Female leaders and their response to the social environment

Gangadharan, Lata; Jain, Tarun; Maitra, Pushkar; Vecci, Joe

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.001

“…This means that we are less likely to observe the HH outcome compared to the NE prediction. For example, given a cutoff of 54, the expected probability of HH play is about 22% 11 which is not that far from the empirical frequency of 19% reported in Table 7. Likewise, the expected probability of DD is 29%, close to the empirical frequency of 31% reported in Table 7.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 56%

“…In specification (I), which includes all periods, we find that social welfare is higher by 20 points in the CGS game and about 15 points in the CGE game, compared to the CGO game. When we restrict the sample to late periods (6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11), the results remain the same (see specification III of Table 12 in Appendix C). Alternatively, we include a trend variable (Period) in Specification (II) with treatment interactions.…”

Section: Results 4 Social Welfare Is Higher In the Cgs And Cge Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…In a bank run experiment, Dijk (2017) reports that women are more likely to withdraw as fear increases, while Kiss et al (2014) do not find significant differences on withdrawing rates across gender. The fear of being the "sucker" may also impede cooperation (see Ingram and Berger, 1977; Van den Assem et al, 2012, and a recent lab-in-thefield experiment in rural India by Gangadharan et al, 2019). However, according to Babcock et al (2017) women can overcome the "sucker" effect in a dynamic volunteer game with strategic substitutes.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The variable P eriod is analyzed at the mean of six, when it is statistically significant 11. Given a cutoff value of y, the probability of playing H is (101 − y)/101 12.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

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Rabanal

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Rud³

et al. 2020

SSRN Journal

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We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that:(i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

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“…In a bank run experiment, Dijk (2017) reports that women are more likely to withdraw as fear increases, while Kiss et al (2014) do not find significant differences on withdrawing rates across gender. The fear of being the "sucker" may also impede cooperation (see Ingram and Berger, 1977; Van den Assem et al, 2012, and a recent lab-in-thefield experiment in rural India by Gangadharan et al, 2019). However, according to Babcock et al (2017) women can overcome the "sucker" effect in a dynamic volunteer game with strategic substitutes.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

An endogenous-timing conflict game

Park

¹

,

Rabanal

²

,

Rud

³

et al. 2021

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

1

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that:(i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

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What feeds on what? Networks of interdependencies between culture and institutions

Jacobi

¹

,

Amendolagine

²

2023

Econ Polit

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Culture and institutions both matter in shaping trajectories for socioeconomic progress. As the debate on causal directionalities between culture and institutions is still ongoing, we recast its perspective: a complex network of symbiotic relationships ties a multitude of cultural and institutional factors together. We blend the institutional complementarities literature with symbiosis theory, and place it into the context of a data-driven approach that extends correlation network analyses. We frame each single interdependence between a cultural and an institutional factor as an asymmetric symbiotic relationship in which a ‘host’ feeds a ‘symbiont’: the latter is more dependent on the former. In our computed network, each relation locates within a broader context of pathways and network constellations. We apply our approach to Brazilian municipal data. Our results confirm high complexity in the coevolution of culture and institutions and suggest an emerging pattern in which cultural factors are more likely to be hosts than institutions or social capital. In the Brazilian municipal reality, the institutional innovation of participatory councils bears the potential of game-changer in the system, while tax collection strongly depends on cultural factors i.e. the (in)formality of the economy and family ties.

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Female leaders and their response to the social environment

Cited by 21 publications

References 34 publications

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

An endogenous-timing conflict game

What feeds on what? Networks of interdependencies between culture and institutions

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