Female Candidate Success in Runoff Primaries

Bullock, Charles S.; Maggiotto, Michael A.

doi:10.1300/j014v24n04_01

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…Research on the differential effects of appointment and election are part of a larger literature on how candidate-selection mechanisms interact with gender (Bullock and Maggiotto 2003; Fiber-Ostrow 2012). Previous studies have seen a variety of relationships between primary elections and women’s success in obtaining nominations.…”

Section: Theory and Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection Mechanisms

Hennings

Urbatsch

2016

State Politics Policy Q.

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How candidates are selected, such as through nomination by party elites or election by primary voters, potentially influences the underrepresentation of women in political office. Partisan differences suggest that primary voters in right-leaning parties might select fewer female nominees than would their left-leaning counterparts even if both parties' elites are equally likely to select female nominees. This hypothesis is confirmed by an analysis of lieutenant governors in the United States, a position that varies in whether candidates are appointed by party elites or elected by primary voters. In cases where lieutenant-governor candidates are appointed, Democratic and Republican gubernatorial nominees are equally likely to choose female running mates; where primary voters select the lieutenant governor, Republicans are less likely to nominate women.

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Section: Theory and Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection Mechanisms

Hennings

Urbatsch

2016

State Politics Policy Q.

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Choosing a runoff election threshold

O'Neill

2006

Public Choice

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This paper investigates when a runoff election is desirable and when a plurality result is good enough. A runoff election increases the likelihood that the Condorcet winner will be elected but also entails additional costs. The metric for determining whether a runoff election is desirable will be the probability that the winner of the plurality election would win an ensuing runoff. Statistical models of voter behavior are developed that estimate this probability, which are verified with runoff-election data from United States elections. The models allow governments to make more informed choices in creating rules to decide when to hold runoff elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Runoff elections, Mathematical modeling,

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Primary Elections

Norrander¹

2010

The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior

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This article focuses on publications of primary elections from the last ten years. The candidate field for primaries contains diversity in both the strength and number of contenders. The direct primary literature actually does a better job at explaining candidate entry. Political science research from the 1980s and 1990s pointed to two main actors in momentum: media and voters. Campaign strategies are more varied and perhaps more effective in primaries rather than general elections. The impact of electoral rules is reported. The 2008 presidential nominations at first glance would appear to break from the pattern of recent nominations. The close contest between Obama and Clinton refocuses attention on the rules: rules for delegate distribution, rules for caucuses, and rules for participation (i.e., open versus closed primaries).

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Female Candidate Success in Runoff Primaries

Cited by 4 publications

References 13 publications

Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection Mechanisms

Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection Mechanisms

Choosing a runoff election threshold

Primary Elections

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