2012
DOI: 10.1007/s12555-012-0510-6
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Feedback control on Nash equilibrium for discrete-time stochastic systems with Markovian jumps: Finite-horizon case

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
15
0

Year Published

2014
2014
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1

Relationship

2
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 9 publications
(15 citation statements)
references
References 16 publications
0
15
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Remark 4 Compared to [23], the result in Theorem 3 is supplementary and practical because [23] investigated the Nash equilibrium in finite time, while this work considers the guaranteed cost Nash equilibrium in infinite time. Regarding the transition probabilities with complete transition descriptions, in [23] the solution of differential game involves four-coupled generalized difference Riccati equations [23], [20], [35], requiring an iterative algorithm [36] to solve these equations. However, this method is no longer suitable for solving optimization problems (47) that satisfy both BMIs and matrix inequalities.…”
Section: Guaranteed Cost Nash Equilibrium Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Remark 4 Compared to [23], the result in Theorem 3 is supplementary and practical because [23] investigated the Nash equilibrium in finite time, while this work considers the guaranteed cost Nash equilibrium in infinite time. Regarding the transition probabilities with complete transition descriptions, in [23] the solution of differential game involves four-coupled generalized difference Riccati equations [23], [20], [35], requiring an iterative algorithm [36] to solve these equations. However, this method is no longer suitable for solving optimization problems (47) that satisfy both BMIs and matrix inequalities.…”
Section: Guaranteed Cost Nash Equilibrium Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The essence of the game relationship is to fully consider the gains and losses of all players and stabilize to a balanced state. However, due to assuming that B 2i = 0, C 1i = 0, the problem of guaranteed cost differential game of [23] and [15] is single-player control game. In this case, the control gains for one player are independent of the other players, and the solutions become simpler.…”
Section: Guaranteed Cost Nash Equilibrium Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, based on the strong Markov property, applying homogeneity in (25) and introducing it in (24), we arrive at…”
Section: Theorem 4 the Mjsls (1) Is -Stable If And Only If For Any mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By introducing stochastic exact observability and stochastic exact detectability, the optimal strategies (Nash equilibrium strategies) and the optimal cost values have been given. In [25], we have considered LQ differential games in finite horizon for discrete-time stochastic systems with Markovian jump parameters and multiplicative noise. Furthermore, a suboptimal solution of the LQ differential games is proposed based on a convex optimization approach.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The class of systems may represent a large variety of processes including those in the production systems, fault-tolerant systems, communication systems, and economic systems [15]. In the past two decades, many important issues of MJSS were researched extensively, such as the controllability and observability [16], stability and stabilization (see [17][18][19][20][21][22]), 2 [23] and ∞ performance [24][25][26][27], and robustness [28,29]. To the best of our knowledge, despite these efforts, very few results are available for the control design for nonlinear MJSS.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%