Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

Ederer, Florian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.691384

Cited by 54 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…This …nding is in contrast with the existing literature. The existing models that study information disclosure in tournaments either a priori restrict attention to the 'extreme' policies of full disclosure and no disclosure (Yildirim, 2005;Ederer, 2010) or show that one of the extreme policies is always optimal, depending on the curvature of the workers' cost function (Aoyagi, 2010). Our results indicate that limiting attention only to the extreme policies may imply a loss of generality, and that the optimal policy can be more nuanced than a simple choice between full and no disclosure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…Others have argued that too much of disclosure may be counterproductive, because it may damage self-esteem and thereby demotivate the employees (Beer, 1990). This paper makes two contributions to a nascent but growing literature on optimal interim feedback (Lizzeri et al, 2002;Yildirim, 2005;Fuchs, 2007;Gershkov and Perry, 2009;Hansen, 2009;Aoyagi, 2010;Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010;Ederer, 2010). First, we highlight a new trade-o¤ associated with the interim performance disclosure in a tournament: a disclosure policy that enhances post-disclosure work incentives may dampen work incentives in the predisclosure stage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The …rst-order conditions with respect to E A (z) and E B (z) can be written as: 9 (2) E A (z) = E A (E B ; e A ; z) and E B (z) = E B (E A ; e B ; z) :…”

Section: Optimal Effortmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we highlight a new trade-o¤ associated with the interim performance disclosure in a tournament: a disclosure policy that enhances post-disclosure work incentives may dampen work incentives in the predisclosure stage. While the existing literature has recognized that the …rm's disclosure policy can a¤ect both the pre-and the post-disclosure e¤ort levels in a tournament (e.g., Yildirim, 2005;Aoyagi, 2010;Ederer, 2010), it has not fully explored the potential trade-o¤ that may arise between the two. 2 Second, we show that, in the face of the aforementioned trade-o¤, partial disclosure can be strictly optimal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure

Goltsman

Mukherjee

2011

Journal of Labor Economics

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Abstract. Workers competing in a tournament for a given prize, say a promotion, often perform sequentially in multiple stages. When the …rm is privately informed about the workers'performance, it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results. But the policies that enhance …nal-stage e¤ort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage. In our model, the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form: disclose only if all workers perform poorly. This result o¤ers a novel justi…cation for partial disclosure in performance feedback. Also, it is in contrast with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of 'full disclosure'and 'no disclosure.'

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The …rst-order conditions with respect to E A (z) and E B (z) can be written as: 9 (2) E A (z) = E A (E B ; e A ; z) and E B (z) = E B (E A ; e B ; z) :…”

Section: Optimal Effortmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure

Goltsman

Mukherjee

2011

Journal of Labor Economics

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“…This yields 47 store-week observations where I t,w−1 = 1, out of a total of 279 treatment store- (6). 19 Note that, as compared to equation (5) Treatment stores' performance may, in addition to the distance to the best control store, also depend on the distance to the second-best control store. Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle the two effects due to problems of multicollinearity.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment

Delfgaauw¹,

Dur²,

Non³

et al. 2014

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, we find that treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to the incentives, while the responsiveness of treatment stores close to winning a bonus increases in relative performance. On average, the introduction of the relative performance pay scheme does not lead to higher performance. JEL-Codes: C93, M52.

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The Role of Goals and Feedback in Incentivizing Performance

Akin

Karagözoğlu

2015

Manage Decis Econ

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In this paper, we experimentally investigate how goal setting and feedback policies affect work performance. In particular, we study the effects of (i) absolute performance feedback, (ii) self‐specified goals, and (iii) exogenous goals and relative performance feedback. Our results show that the average performance of the subjects who are provided self‐performance feedback is 11% lower than the ones who obtain no feedback. Moreover, setting a non‐binding personal goal does not affect performance. Finally, assigning an exogenous goal and providing relative performance feedback decreases performance by 8%. We discuss the insights our findings offer for the optimal design of goal setting and feedback mechanisms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

Cited by 54 publications

References 28 publications

Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure

Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment

The Role of Goals and Feedback in Incentivizing Performance

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