Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing

Pricing joint use of municipal services: Theoretical perspectives and regulatory issues

“…the appropriate portion of overheads) (Local Government Association of South Australia, 2013; Sipilä, 2003). Full-cost pricing is widely applied in public policies and public law-based regulation (Coller & Collini, 2015;Groot & Budding, 2004;Harmon, 2015). Sources: Arrunada (2001) and Ellwood (1996).…”

Closing the Gap: The Need for Inclusive Benefit-cost Analysis in Policing

“…The problem with such an approach, however, is that it ignores the very real tangible and intangible costs of policing, especially to the minority population that is most impacted by its negative consequences. Not surprisingly, this group is often the most politically weak in a community, and has little opportunity to offset the inequities in discussions about policing (Harmon, 2015). Harmon (2015), for example, states that because only a small percentage of the population is searched, arrested, or really has any interaction with the police, there is a “decoupling between the population that experiences the benefits of policing – which are widely distributed – and the population that pays its costs, which are concentrated on a smaller, politically weak minority, including criminal suspects” (p. 941).…”

“…Not surprisingly, this group is often the most politically weak in a community, and has little opportunity to offset the inequities in discussions about policing (Harmon, 2015). Harmon (2015), for example, states that because only a small percentage of the population is searched, arrested, or really has any interaction with the police, there is a “decoupling between the population that experiences the benefits of policing – which are widely distributed – and the population that pays its costs, which are concentrated on a smaller, politically weak minority, including criminal suspects” (p. 941). Incorporation of the arrest, incarceration, and collateral costs of a police practice, therefore, will provide a voice to those who have been excluded from decisions surrounding policing programs.…”

Collateral Incentives to Arrest

“…279 While the creation of collateral incentives may not run afoul of the constitutional rules, it is certainly in tension with the federalist preference to leave the police power to state control. 280 In tension with the incentives set up by Secure Communities, Oregon law, for example, prohibits state law enforcement from using agency "moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.…”