Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees

Glabbeek, Rob van; Gramoli, Vincent; Tholoniat, Pierre

doi:10.1145/3350755.3400264

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…To exchange data among blockchains [15] [16], it requires to ensure the correct execution sequence of actions of different smart contracts. To ensure the correctness of cross-chain payment protocols, a new specification formalism formalizes its protocols and ensures those protocols work correctly even in the presence of a clock skew [17]. Those works focus more on the correct synchronization of actions among different blockchains to achieve a specific goal.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantitative cooperation analysis among cross-chain smart contracts

Guo

et al. 2022

Neural Comput & Applic

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In cross-chain scenarios, there are different blockchains, which need to cooperate. Cooperation among different blockchains is done by smart contracts that work together to complete cross-chain tasks. When numerous cooperative smart contracts are involved, smart contracts form a complex interaction network, which makes it difficult to evaluate the cooperation. It needs a common model to quantitatively analyze the crosschain cooperation of associated smart contracts. In this paper, we model the cooperation among smart contracts as conditions and their corresponding actions, the condition-trigger model. Then we propose the method to calculate the cooperation probabilities by the graph weight. As the edge weight lacks the information of interaction probabilities, we introduce the dimension of the edge weight to calculate the probabilities. Finally, we verify the proposed condition-trigger model and its different types. It demonstrates that our proposed methods can effectively analyze the cross-chain cooperation among smart contracts.

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Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are results of one or several dynamic triggers after D. Otherwise, if they encounter any all-trigger after D, there is at least a dimension difference. The calculation is to directly add them, as shown in (17).…”

Section: A Probabilities Calculation 1) Relationship Among Different ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantitative cooperation analysis among cross-chain smart contracts

Guo

et al. 2022

Neural Comput & Applic

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“…In future work, we plan to study premiums in asynchronous protocols such as those proposed by Glabbeek et al [16], Ranchal-Pedrosa and Gramoli [13] and Herlihy et al [8].…”

Section: Proof Suppose Bob Is the High Biddermentioning

confidence: 99%

Hedging Against Sore Loser Attacks in Cross-Chain Transactions

Xue

Herlihy

2021

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

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A sore loser attack in cross-blockchain commerce rises when one party decides to halt participation partway through, leaving other parties' assets locked up for a long duration. Although vulnerability to sore loser attacks cannot be entirely eliminated, it can be reduced to an arbitrarily low level. This paper proposes new distributed protocols for hedging a range of cross-chain transactions in a synchronous communication model, such as two-party swaps, -party swaps, brokered transactions, and auctions.

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Cross-chain payment protocols with success guarantees

2023

Self Cite

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In this paper, we consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows—implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract—successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We introduce a new specification formalism called Asynchronous Networks of Timed Automata to formalise such protocols. We present the first cross-chain payment protocol that ensures termination in a bounded amount of time and works correctly in the presence of clock drift. We then demonstrate that it is impossible to solve this problem without assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time. Yet, we solve an eventually terminating weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.

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Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

Quantitative cooperation analysis among cross-chain smart contracts

Quantitative cooperation analysis among cross-chain smart contracts

Hedging Against Sore Loser Attacks in Cross-Chain Transactions

Cross-chain payment protocols with success guarantees

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