Fear of war and mental health in Germany

Abstract

Purpose The objective of this study was to clarify the association between fear of war (both conventional war and nuclear war) and mental health (in terms of probable depression and probable anxiety). Methods Data were used from the general adult population in Germany (n = 3091 individuals; 15th March–21st March 2022). Probable depression and probable anxiety were both quantified using validated tools (PHQ-9/GAD-7). Multiple logistic regressions were used, adjusting for several sociodemographic, lifestyle-related and health-related factors. Results In total, 23.1% of the individuals had probable depression and 16.0% of the individuals had probable anxiety. Multiple logistic regression showed that the likelihood of probable depression was positively associated with fear of a conventional war (OR 1.25, 95% CI 1.14–1.37). Furthermore, it was associated with fear of a nuclear war (OR 1.22, 95% CI 1.12–1.33). Additionally, regressions showed that the likelihood of probable anxiety was positively associated with fear of a conventional war (OR 1.66, 95% CI 1.49–1.86). Moreover, it was associated with fear of a nuclear war (OR 1.54, 95% CI 1.39–1.71). Conclusions Our findings stress the importance of fear of war for mental health in the general adult population in Germany. Upcoming research in this area is necessary.

The Discourse of Daily Life during the War: the 2022 Ukrainian Projection

“…This reinforces the extremity of gaining the new experience of adapting to life in the new reality. Experiencing of the threat of war in Ukraine caused a rise in anxiety, depression, despair, uncertainty, and reduced level of psychological wellbeing even in safe countries of Europe (Brągiel & Gambin, 2022;Hajek et al, 2022;Mărcău et al, 2022;Skwirczyńska et al, 2022). And in Ukraine the lives of tens of millions of people changed drastically after the full-scale Russian invasion of February 24, 2022.…”

“…That is the website where you can see what is generally happening in the battlefield, I see what has been invaded, what has not, where their army is now, where our army is now, and that's it" (2). This is the principle "it is inadequate to have one optic" (5), one should compare different points of view (8) and the principle of active interference into the very process of information provision -"it is interesting to follow what they write there. You can correct some of their ideas in the comments or in personal messages" (5).…”

“…We are jointly responsible for every action taken by our state" (5). And in spite of the fact that they don't have any choice, they "are responsible for the actions of the candidate selected by them to rule the country" (8).…”

“…(22) Changes can be traced both at the level of external manifestations (air alarms, curfew) (2), and at the level of perception of life itself (5), and at the level of enhancement of emotions ( 8), and higher anxiety (22). The most significant changes, in the opinion of the representatives of this position are changes in the value field of human life -"a person starts reconsidering his actions, values and the general vector along which he is moving in this life" (8). And not just existential values (life, security, etc.)…”

“…(5) These coping strategies may be referred to the category of passive ones since they do not presuppose any activity-based approach. In their majority, the representatives of the optimistic fatalism position declare non-activity approach while adapting to changes -to sleep with the thought about the worst possible changes, to stay among other people, to repeat already functioning rituals, to just rely on the effect of mental safeguards (8), to rely on the algorithm of actions suggested by someone -"it is bad to get accustomed to the war, but now I don't turn grey whenever I just hear the alarm signal -there is a clear and cold-minded realisation of the action algorithm" (22). And that, in fact, reflects the principles of such optimistic fatalism -why act if everything is going to be fine anyway.…”