‘Fear and loathing across party lines’ (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems

Abstract

Several scholars in the United States have recently addressed an increased partisan animosity between Democrats and Republicans, and have termed this phenomenon 'affective polarisation' . This surge in partisan affective polarisation is perceived to be highly problematic, as it has been found to have a negative impact on the functioning of the party system and even society at large. The aim of this article is to study the concept of affective polarisation in European party systems. It introduces the Affective Polarisation Index (API) that allows for measuring and comparing levels of affective polarisation also in multiparty systems. This novel measure is applied to 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016.The results indicate that affective polarisation is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties. The most affectively polarised countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe where the degree of affective polarisation is notably higher than it is in the United States, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. Further analysis reveals that affective polarisation is significantly correlated with ideological polarisation, but the relationship between the two appears to be conditional: in some Western European political systems ideological polarisation does not lead itself to strong interparty hostility, while in Central Eastern Europe a high degree of affective polarisation can be present even in ideologically centrist party structures. These findings validate the claim that ideological and affective polarisation are two distinct aspects of polarisation, and that the latter also merits additional attention.

Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the United States

“…The findings suggest that the differences in levels of partisan affective polarization between the United States and Norway are indistinguishable from chance when using a direct measure of affective polarization towards voters. However, when using a measure of affective polarization towards parties that has been applied frequently in comparative studies (e.g., Gidron et al 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020), I find, in line with Gidron et al's (2019) results, that the US respondents are statistically significantly more affectively polarized than Norwegians. This is an important addition to existing evidence concerning affective polarization across systems because these results provide empirical support for Druckman and Levendusky's (2019) argument that evidence of affect towards parties cannot necessarily be generalized to affect towards voters.…”

“…Much of the literature indicates that affective polarization is no higher in the United States than it is in countries with multiparty systems. For instance, comparative studies measuring affective polarization have reached this conclusion using trust games (Westwood et al 2018) and voters' feelings towards parties (e.g., Gidron et al 2019; Reiljan 2020). However, comparing multiparty and two‐party systems is not straightforward.…”

“…With this in mind, I focus on an alternative solution that views partisan affective polarization as affective distance from voters between blocs of multiple parties (Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020). Party blocs can arise, for instance, when a coalition of parties forms government.…”

“…This focus on the United States has led scholars (e.g., Gidron et al 2019; Iyengar et al 2019) to call for more comparative studies on affective polarization. Consequently, a growing body of literature is providing comparative evidence of affective polarization suggesting that the US situation is not unique (Carlin & Love 2016; Hansen & Kosiara‐Pedersen 2017; Huddy et al 2018; Lauka et al 2018; Westwood et al 2018; Gidron et al 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020).…”

“…3. 3. Inspired by Reiljan’s (2019) and Wagner’s (2020) approach, I use the like/dislike measure to calculate the average difference in voters’ feelings towards their in‐bloc and out‐bloc. …”