Favoritism Under Social Pressure

Garicano, Luis; Palacios, Ignacio; Prendergast, Canice

doi:10.3386/w8376

Cited by 159 publications

(268 citation statements)

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“…As can be seen in Figure 1, this form of favouritism does not emerge in our sample. This is similar to the findings of Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) for Germany but it is in contrast to Garicano et al (2005) who find that Spanish referees also favour home teams when they are ahead. A possible explanation could be that referees get less pressure because the risk of the visiting team's scoring is significantly lower than the possibility of the home team's scoring (see Table 1).…”

Section: Data and First Evidence On Referee Biascontrasting

confidence: 38%

“…Prendergast and Topel (1996) present a model in which supervisors in organizations trade-off the satisfying of personal preferences towards subordinates with a wage penalty deriving from biased evaluations. Garicano et al (2001) explicitly model the trade-off referees face between material incentives deriving from a high probability of being re-appointed, if impartial, and their desires to satisfy the crowd.…”

Section: What Causes Favouritism Towards Home Teams?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Table 3, in order to check the robustness of our results, we follow Garicano et al (2005), in defining an alternative dummy variable to gauge a team's need for injury time (Home Behind…”

Section: Alternative Measures Of Favouritismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…analysis of Garicano, Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast (2005) who study soccer referee performance in the Spanish "Primera Liga" and Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) who conduct a similar analysis for the German "Bundesliga". All these works find evidence of favouritism towards home teams.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Scoppa

2007

Empir Econ

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Section: Data and First Evidence On Referee Biascontrasting

confidence: 38%

Section: What Causes Favouritism Towards Home Teams?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Table 3, in order to check the robustness of our results, we follow Garicano et al (2005), in defining an alternative dummy variable to gauge a team's need for injury time (Home Behind…”

Section: Alternative Measures Of Favouritismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Scoppa

2007

Empir Econ

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“…2 The rich datasets available for professional sports have been noticed by economists, and a significant number of papers have conducted empirical economic analyses using such datasets. See, e.g., Hausman and Leonard (1997), Kahn (2000), Chiappori et al (2002), Duggan and Levitt (2002), Garicano et al (2005), Romer (2006), Price and Wolfers (2010), Parson et al (2011), Abramitzky et al (2012) and Kahane et al (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Termination Risk and Agency Problems: Evidence from the NBA

2015

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When agents face a risk of termination by the principal in the short term, they may underinvest in projects whose results would be realized only in the long term. We use data on decisions made by NBA coaches to study how risk of termination by the principal affects the behavior of agents. Because letting a rookie play produces long-term benefits on which coaches with a shorter investment horizon might place lower weight, we hypothesize that higher termination risk might lead to lower rookie participation. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that, during the period of the NBA's 1999 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and controlling for the characteristics of rookies and their teams, higher termination risk was associated with lower rookie participation and that this association was driven by important games. We also find that the association does not exist for second-year players and that the identified association disappeared when the 2005 CBA gave team owners stronger incentives to monitor the performance of rookies and preclude their underuse. JEL Classification: D20, J44, K00, L83 * We would like to thank Lucian Bebchuk, Liran Einav, Yaniv Grinstein, Saul Lach, Yona Rubinstein, Analia Schlosser, Charles Wang and workshop participants at Harvard, Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and IDC for helpful comments and conversations, and Zvika Messing for valuable research assistance. ᵼ Harvard Law School, Tel-Aviv University, and NBER ᵵ Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) ᵴ Tel-Aviv University 1

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Social Pressure at the Plate: Inequality Aversion, Status, and Mere Exposure

Mills

2013

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper uses professional baseball data to evaluate the impact of social pressures on subjective decisions made by officials. Umpires show tendencies consistent with both centrality bias and favoritism toward players with higher status in the league. Results also indicate that the odds of a strike are lower for batters in close proximity to the official throughout the game. Implications extend beyond sport to issues regarding closeness of contact in employee–manager relationships and pay and promotions decisions in the workplace. Given the persistent monitoring of officials in professional baseball, this phenomenon could be more prevalent in less scrutinized positions in other industries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Favoritism Under Social Pressure

Cited by 159 publications

References 0 publications

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Termination Risk and Agency Problems: Evidence from the NBA

Social Pressure at the Plate: Inequality Aversion, Status, and Mere Exposure

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