Fatalism and Future Contingents

Andreoletti, Giacomo

doi:10.1111/phib.12157

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…Therefore, we are speaking here about a broad understanding of cause -it could be an event such as God's decision or human sin, and it could produce another event as a result. On the contrary, in (1) there is no connection based on which a certain event would be a result, and in this way would be determined. It is only assumed that God knows future events or, in a generalized version, that the value of the sentences about future events is set, and that they can be either true or false.…”

Section: Kinds Of Determinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[2, p. 148]). 1 Robert underlines that there are some who mean something else by necessity of condition, namely necessity of consecution of the consequent from the antecedent, but in fact ("in more depth") Boethius refers there to what Robert calls sequent necessity. Now, in both recensions Grosseteste presents, in a very similar way (so I will now quote the later recension again), a crucial division, according to which something may be: 1) necessary "unqualifiedly" (simpliciter), which means that "it has no capacity (posse) at all for its opposite, either with or without a beginning," e.g.…”

Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Trepczyński

2020

Studia Humana

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In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that something lacks the capacity (posse) for its opposite, and the distinction between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1) the one according to which the truthfulness of a dictum determines that it cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.

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Section: Kinds Of Determinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Trepczyński

2020

Studia Humana

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“…Cicero also attributes a similar critique of Aristotelian Open Futurism on behalf of the Academic Skeptic, Gaius Cotta, who is in dialogue with the Epicurean, Gaius Vellius. 21 See Andreoletti's (2019) discussion of how both Aristotelian Open Futurism and the AFV critically engage in a similar way with arguments for fatalism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Freedom and the open future

Cohen

2022

Philosophical Books

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The future ain’t what it used to be

Andreoletti

Spolaore

2021

Synthese

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This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change—that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it (or vice versa). Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, (i) we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and (ii) we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons.

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Fatalism and Future Contingents

Cited by 4 publications

References 17 publications

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Freedom and the open future

The future ain’t what it used to be

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