Fast-Forward Mitigation Schemes for Cognitive Adversary

Chaudhary, Veena; Harshan, J.

doi:10.1109/tccn.2021.3070582

Cited by 9 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…However, due to fast-forward FD relaying, our work cannot be viewed as a direct extension of [7], [8], [9], or [10]. The work closest to our idea are [5] and [6], where the authors assume an FD jam and measure adversary. However, [5] and [6] assume a slow-fading channel between the nodes and base-station, whereas this work considers a fast-fading channel.…”

Section: B Related Work and Noveltymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although Frequency Hopping (FH) is known to combat DoS attack, it requires the victim to hop out of the operating frequency, thus dropping the power level on the jammed band. Moreover, with advancements in Self-Interference Cancellation (SIC) techniques in Full-Duplex (FD) radios [3], a jammer can use an FD radio for jamming [4] and to detect a drop in power level [5], [6]. For instance, [5] and [6] model an adversary which uses in-band FD radio to jam a frequency band while simultaneously measuring the power fluctuation on the jammed band.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, with advancements in Self-Interference Cancellation (SIC) techniques in Full-Duplex (FD) radios [3], a jammer can use an FD radio for jamming [4] and to detect a drop in power level [5], [6]. For instance, [5] and [6] model an adversary which uses in-band FD radio to jam a frequency band while simultaneously measuring the power fluctuation on the jammed band. The jammer, in this case, detects a countermeasure if it experiences a drop in the power level of the jammed frequency band.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The jammer, in this case, detects a countermeasure if it experiences a drop in the power level of the jammed frequency band. [5] and [6] also discuss the mitigation techniques to combat FD jamming attacks using fast-forward cooperative communication. Here, the victim node and the FD helper node use non-coherent and coherent modulation techniques, respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The countermeasure provided by [5] and [6] assume a slowfading channel; thus, the helper uses coherent modulation techniques. However, when channel conditions vary rapidly, coherent detection is challenging.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-Coherent Fast-Forward Relays for Full-Duplex Jamming Attack

Chaudhary¹,

Harshan²

2021

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This work addresses a strategy to mitigate jamming attack on low-latency communication by a Full-Duplex (FD) adversary in fast-fading channel conditions. The threat model is such that the FD adversary can jam a frequency band and measure the jammed band's power level. We first point out that due to the presence of this FD adversary, Frequency Hopping (FH) fails. We then propose a fast-forward cooperative relaying scheme, wherein the victim node hops to the frequency band of a nearby FD helper node that fast-forwards the victim's symbol along with its symbol. At the same time, the victim and the helper cooperatively pour some fraction of their power on the jammed band to engage the adversary. Due to fast-fading channel conditions, the victim and the helper use amplitude based non-coherent signalling referred to as Non-Coherent Fast-Forward Full-Duplex (NC-F2FD) relaying. To minimize the errorrate of this strategy, we jointly design the constellations at the helper node and the victim node by formulating an optimization problem. Using non-trivial results, we first analyse the objective function and then, based on the analytical results, propose a lowcomplexity algorithm to synthesize the fast-forwarded constellations. Through simulations, we show that the error performance of the victim improves after employing our countermeasure.

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