The GMR-2 cipher is a type of stream cipher currently being used in some inmarsat satellite phones. It has been proven that such a cipher can be cracked using only one single-frame (15 bytes) known keystream but with moderate executing time. In this paper, we present a new thorough security analysis of the GMR-2 cipher. We first study the inverse properties of the cipher's components to reveal a bad one-way character of the cipher. By then introducing a new concept called "valid key chain" according to the cipher's key schedule, we propose an unprecedented real-time inversion attack using a single-frame keystream. This attack comprises three phases: (1) table generation; (2) dynamic table look-up, filtration and combination; and (3) verification. Our analysis shows that, using the proposed attack, the size of the exhaustive search space for the 64-bit encryption key can be reduced to approximately 2 13 when a single-frame keystream is available. Compared with previous known attacks, this inversion attack is much more efficient. Finally, the proposed attack is carried out on a 3.3-GHz PC, and the experimental results thus obtained demonstrate that the 64-bit encryption-key could be recovered in approximately 0.02 s on average. Keywords satellite phone, stream cipher, GMR-2, cryptanalysis, inversion attack Citation Hu J, Li R L, Tang C J. A real-time inversion attack on the GMR-2 cipher used in the satellite phones.