Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods

Kawasaki, Ryo; Muto, Shigeo

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.11.004

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Although we did not consider such a FSS, investigating it is also important since it may have novel implications. For example, Kawasaki and Muto (2009) showed that the multiple-payoff FSS supports the over-contribution to a public good in a voluntary contributing situation as we reviewed in Section 3, which has been rarely discussed in the literature so far. As we pointed out in Section 5, investigating the FSS with multiple payoffs should exploit the structure of the specific game.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…On the other hand, a FSS yielding multiple payoffs may exist in a number of strategic games. See for example, Suzuki and Muto (2005) and Kawasaki and Muto (2009). Although we did not consider such a FSS, investigating it is also important since it may have novel implications.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We show this fact by employing the lumpy public good game due to Taylor (1987), the FSS of which was investigated by Kawasaki and Muto (2009).…”

Section: The Farsighted Stable Set and The Inclusive Setmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…On the other hand, the lumpy public good game appeared in section 3 has a quite different type of the FSS with multiple payoffs as shown by Kawasaki and Muto (2009). They showed that there exist an inefficient FSS except for the case where r * = n − 1: any x ∈ X with r * ≤ |C(x)| < n is contained in at least one FSS, while x is efficient if and only if |C(x)| = r * .…”

Section: Suzuki and Muto (2005) Showed That For Any X ∈ X [X] = {X} mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Masuda (2002) for the average return game of a production economy; Suzuki and Muto (2005) and Nakanishi (2009) for the prisoners' dilemma game with and without coalitional deviation, respectively; Kawasaki and Muto (2009) for the indivisible public good provision game, Kamijo and Muto (2010) for cartel formation game; Shino and Kawasaki (2012) for the Hotelling's location game; Kawasaki, et al (2015) for the tariff game, among others. 1 In the most of these literature, the farsighted stable sets each of which yields a single payoff vector were well-investigated and shown to have nice properties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies

Hirai

2017

Int J Game Theory

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We investigate the farsighted stable set in a class of strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. In this class of games, each player has a strategy that uniformly minimizes the other players' payoffs for any given strategies of other players. We particularly investigate a special class of the farsighted stable sets each of which consists of strategy profiles yielding a single payoff vector. We call such farsighted stable sets as the single-payoff farsighted stable sets. We propose a concept called the inclusive set that completely characterizes the single-payoff farsighted stable sets in the strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. We also show that the set of payoff vectors yielded by the single-payoff farsighted stable sets is closely related to the strict α-core in strategic games. Further, we apply the results to the strategic games where each player has two strategies and strategic games associated with some market models.JEL Classification: C70, C71

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We show this fact by employing the lumpy public good game due to Taylor (1987), the FSS of which was investigated by Kawasaki and Muto (2009).…”

Section: The Farsighted Stable Set and The Inclusive Setmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Suzuki and Muto (2005) Showed That For Any X ∈ X [X] = {X} mentioning

confidence: 99%