Family control and ownership monitoring in Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance

Sakawa, Hideaki; Watanabel, Naoki

doi:10.1108/md-04-2018-0480

Cited by 33 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 68 publications

(81 reference statements)

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“…That is why they encourage anti-takeover from outsiders by improving corporate performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This finding is also consistent with controlling owners in Japan where families do not expropriate the rights of minority shareholders because they are stewards (Sakawa & Watanabel, 2019). However, agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separating ownership and management.…”

Section: Why Do Non-controlling Shareholderssupporting

confidence: 74%

Protection of Minority Shareholder Investment in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Kanthapanit¹,

Kanthapanit²

2020

JAFEB

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This study aims to examine the relationship of the four factors that increase the protection of minority shareholder investment. The factors are non-controlling shareholders, corporate governance, free cash flow, and shareholder wealth. The data for this study is obtained from the 2017 annual reports of 136 Thai public companies listed in the Market of Alternative Investment of Thailand (MAI). The analysis uses a multiple regression model to determine which factors encourage and which inhibit the protection of minority shareholder investment. The study tests four hypotheses. The results rejected H1 because non-controlling shareholders have negatively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta -0.155 and p-value 0.050). The results accepted H2, H3 and H4 as follows. H2: corporate governance has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.17 and p-value 0.031). H3: free cash flow has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.214 and p-value 0.007). H4: shareholder wealth has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.318 and p-value 0.000). The major findings suggest strong minority shareholder investment protection was enhanced by increasing corporate governance, free cash flow and shareholder wealth. The protection of minority shareholder investment needs to reduce non-controlling shareholding pattern.

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Section: Why Do Non-controlling Shareholderssupporting

confidence: 74%

Protection of Minority Shareholder Investment in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Kanthapanit¹,

Kanthapanit²

2020

JAFEB

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“…In addition, long-term orientation is strongly observed in Asian countries like China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea [52]. Therefore, family members adopting stewardship roles are expected in Asian collectivist cultures like Japan [53].…”

Section: Family Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family Control and Corporate Innovation in Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

Sakawa

Watanabel

2021

Sustainability

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This study investigates the effects of family control on corporate innovation activity in publicly traded firms in Japan under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. In a sample of 14,991 firm-year observations in publicly traded firms in Japan during the period 2007 to 2016, we tested whether family owners or board members are enhancing research and development investments. While theoretical perspectives of principal–principal conflicts generally assume a negative relationship between family control and research and development intensity, we find a positive relationship, which supports the stewardship theory perspective. Additionally, we find that main bank ownership positively moderates the relationship between family control and research and development, suggesting that the main bank could affect the decision-making of family board members in the long-term. This result is supported by the close relationships between the main bank and client firms. Furthermore, our study reveals that the shareholder orientation of foreign shareholders suppresses family board members’ long-term orientation. We conclude that the exploitation presumed by principal–principal conflict perspectives has not been thoroughly investigated in Japan’s stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system.

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“…One way is through family board members. Family board members can influence decision making by expressing opinions on board meetings (Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018). Companies with family ownership may face problems.…”

Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital Banking, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and Intellectual Capital Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

Tjendani

Widagdo

Muthmainah

2018

Jurnal Keuangan Dan Perbankan

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The base of the company's growth has changed, from tangible assets to intangible assets. Many companies recognize the importance of IC as performance drivers. This research aimed to examine the effect of the implementation of digital banking, corporate governance, family ownership, foreign ownership, and government ownership on Intellectual Capital (IC) performance; and examined the effect of interactions between corporate governance and ownership structure on IC performance in banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2012-2016. This research used a regression method with panel data. The total observations were 130 cases. In this research, IC performance used Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC). We proved that the implementation of digital banking did no significant implications for IC performance in the same year because it was still in the process of developing. Family ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership, and the interaction between corporate governance and ownership structure did not affect IC performance. On the contrary, this research proved that corporate governance had significant implications for improving IC performance.

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Family control and ownership monitoring in Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance

Cited by 33 publications

References 68 publications

Protection of Minority Shareholder Investment in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Protection of Minority Shareholder Investment in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Family Control and Corporate Innovation in Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

Digital Banking, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and Intellectual Capital Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

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