False Positives and Transparency

Libgober, Jonathan

doi:10.1257/mic.20190218

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Libgober (2020) shows that this convexity condition is naturally generated if follow-on work is proportional to beliefs and if the researcher prefers follow-on work when θ = T .…”

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Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements

Abrams

Libgober

List

2020

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The past few decades have ushered in an experimental revolution in economics whereby scholars are now much more likely to generate their own data. While there are virtues associated with this movement, there are concomitant difficulties. Several scientific disciplines, including economics, have launched research registries in an effort to attenuate key inferential issues. This study assesses registries both empirically and theoretically, with a special focus on the AEA registry. We find that over 90% of randomized control trials (RCTs) in economics do not register, only 50% of the RCTs that register do so before the intervention begins, and the majority of these preregistrations are not detailed enough to significantly aid inference. Our empirical analysis further shows that using other scientific registries as aspirational examples is misguided, as their perceived success in tackling the main issues is largely a myth. In light of these facts, we advance a simple economic model to explore potential improvements. A key insight from the model is that removal of the (current) option to register completed RCTs could increase the fraction of trials that register. We also argue that linking IRB applications to registrations could further increase registry effectiveness.

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“…Libgober (2020) shows that this convexity condition is naturally generated if follow-on work is proportional to beliefs and if the researcher prefers follow-on work when θ = T .…”

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confidence: 98%

“…However, we are not aware of any models that speak to registration. For examples and further discussions of this growing literature, see Di Tillio, Ottaviani and Sorenson (2019), Libgober (2020), Al-Ubaydli, List and Suskind (2019), Tetenov (2016) and Anderson and Magruder (2017).…”

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Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements

Abrams

Libgober

List

2020

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Credible Persuasion

Lin,

Liu

2024

Journal of Political Economy

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Organizing Data Analytics

Alonso

Câmara

2024

Management Science

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We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00207 .

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False Positives and Transparency

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements

Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements

Credible Persuasion

Organizing Data Analytics

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