2018
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2018.2798817
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False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis

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Cited by 143 publications
(62 citation statements)
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“…Remark 2.2. The objective of the attacker can have specific physical significances under certain circumstances, such as maximizing the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) [13], minimizing the cost for launching an attack [14]. Therefore, the controller can realize the cost function of the attacker based on these features in real-life situations.…”
Section: Framework Of Switched Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Remark 2.2. The objective of the attacker can have specific physical significances under certain circumstances, such as maximizing the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) [13], minimizing the cost for launching an attack [14]. Therefore, the controller can realize the cost function of the attacker based on these features in real-life situations.…”
Section: Framework Of Switched Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Apart from the prominent Nash games which models simultaneous decision making process, Stackelberg games [1], which have superiority in modelling sequential decision making processes, have been introduced to analyze the security of networked control systems as well. A static Stackelberg game in [14] modelled the interactive decisionmaking procedure between the defender and the attacker, where the defender attempts to allocate defense resources to defend against the false data injection attack launched by the malicious attacker. In [37], a dynamic Stackelberg game was proposed in the resilient control problem for discrete-time linear systems, and sufficient conditions are established for the stability of the closed-loop system corresponding to the Stackelberg equilibrium.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consensus is a basic requirement for coordinated control of distributed multiagent systems (MASs). It has witnessed remarkable progress due to its broad and potential applications in mobile robots, formation control of unmanned systems, and power systems, for example, References 1‐8 and the references therein. In a typical consensus design, each agent updates its controller by continuously measuring the states or outputs of its neighbors by a wireless network 9‐11 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this situation, the traditional control systems have been evolved to networked control systems (NCSs). As shown in [7][8][9], there exist many advantages of NCSs such as low cost, simple installation and maintenance, reduced weight and power requirements as well as high reliability comparing with traditional feedback control systems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%