2020
DOI: 10.1109/tcst.2019.2903446
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False Data Injection Attacks in Bilateral Teleoperation Systems

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Cited by 27 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…where M 0 represents null hypothesis, M 1 represents under attack hypothesis, ρ represents threshold discussed in [100,101] used for the SCADA system, and the same results have been shown in [102]. Q 2 detector with cosine has been explained in [95,103,104] for the detection of false data injection attacks which affects smart grid. An algorithm is discussed for the detection of deception attack in an application which could be remote state application, smart sensors used for data receiving [105].…”
Section: Q 2 Detector Kalman Filtersmentioning
confidence: 86%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…where M 0 represents null hypothesis, M 1 represents under attack hypothesis, ρ represents threshold discussed in [100,101] used for the SCADA system, and the same results have been shown in [102]. Q 2 detector with cosine has been explained in [95,103,104] for the detection of false data injection attacks which affects smart grid. An algorithm is discussed for the detection of deception attack in an application which could be remote state application, smart sensors used for data receiving [105].…”
Section: Q 2 Detector Kalman Filtersmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…By applying suitable threshold, we can find malicious node. Some numerical results of such malicious nodes has been studied in [92,95]. With the use of this model, we can find malicious node.…”
Section: Simulation Environment For Agent-based Mas Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This attack is fully discussed with proof in [38]. The contribution in this work is done on attack detection using the DL techniques.…”
Section: Assumptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where K d , K p , K dm ∈ R + . For the BTOS with a PD-like control method represented in Figure 9, the attacker can affect the system by FDI attacks, which can intelligently replace the signals (q T i , q T i ) T being exchanged by the robots with (q T i ,q T i ) T for i = m, s. For BTS, the DFDIA is discussed with respect to a specific form of storage function represented by ( 49 In 2016, Dong, Gupta and Chopra [150] For a BTOS with dynamics (47) controlled by (48). A FDI attack that changes the states being transmitted between the robots of the BTSs as ( 50):…”
Section: ❒ Issn: 2089-4856mentioning
confidence: 99%