False But Significant: The Development of Falsity in Religious Cognition in Light of the Holism of the Mental

Levy, Gabriel

doi:10.1163/157006812x632865

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…The issue of avoiding correspondence theories of truth is what makes essays like "What metaphors mean" (Davidson 1978(Davidson (1984) and Hans Penner's use of it (1995;Levy 2012) especially strange. In these essays, Davidson and Penner come down to decide that some ways of speaking are specifically false.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, I think this question is important. For example, it provides nuance to Hans Penner's claim that religious language is patently false (1995; see also Levy 2012); regarding religious language as a kind of believed fiction is the best way to understand Penner's claim. The question is also important in that it will allow us, I will argue below, to think of scientific, not just religious, language as a form of fiction.…”

Section: Varieties Of Fictionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Davidson paid far less attention to truth than falsity; but we can extend his minimalistic arguments about truth to the concept of falsity as well (seeLevy 2012).…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

“… Davidson does not disparage the usefulness of metaphor-rather he thinks that it has the use that it does precisely because its patent falsehood jars us into thinking about what real point is that the speaker is making (seeLevy 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?

Levy¹

2018

Method Theory Study Relig.

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According to Deborah Tollefsen, from the analytic perspective called “interpretivism”, there is a reasonable way in which groups can be said to have mental states. She bases her argument on the every-day use of language, where people speak as if groups have states such as intentions, desires and wishes. Such propositional attitudes form the basis of any account of truth-conditional semantics, the rules by which people grasp the conditions under which an utterance is true. If groups (abstract units of people) have mental states, perhaps superhuman agents have them too. One argument that may contradict this premise is one that says that, whereas groups exist, superhuman agents do not. However, if groups exist on the basis of normative narratives about them and the institutionalized actions they carry out in the world, the same can be said for superhuman agents. They are like legal fictions: fictional but real. Superhuman agents are fictional and real in a similar sense as groups.1

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Varieties Of Fictionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Davidson paid far less attention to truth than falsity; but we can extend his minimalistic arguments about truth to the concept of falsity as well (seeLevy 2012).…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?

Levy¹

2018

Method Theory Study Relig.

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“…I will not rehash debates from the analytical philosophy of language and mind in these pages. I have previously published extensively about how these subjects relate to religion and the study of religion (G. Levy 2010Levy , 2012Levy , 2014Levy , 2018.…”

Section: Davidson Core Aspectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Heaven and Earth

Laurent¹

2022

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An approach to understanding religion that draws on both humanities and natural science but rejects approaches that employ simple monisms and radical dualisms. In Beyond Heaven and Earth, Gabriel Levy argues that collective religious narratives and beliefs are part of nature; they are the basis for the formation of the narratives and beliefs of individuals. Religion grows out of the universe, but to make sense of it we have to recognize the paradox that the universe is both mental and material (or neither). We need both humanities and natural science approaches to study religion and religious meaning, Levy contends, but we must also recognize the limits of these approaches. First, we must make the dominant metaphysics that undergird the various disciplines of science and humanities more explicit, and second, we must reject those versions of metaphysics that maintain simple monisms and radical dualisms. Bringing Donald Davidson's philosophy—a form of pragmatism known as anomalous monism—to bear on religion, Levy offers a blueprint for one way that the humanities and natural sciences can have a mutually respectful dialogue. Levy argues that in order to understand religions we have to take their semantic content seriously. We need to rethink such basic concepts as narrative fiction, information, agency, creativity, technology, and intimacy. In the course of his argument, Levy considers the relation between two closely related semantics, fiction and religion, and outlines a new approach to information. He then applies his theory to discrete cases: ancient texts, modern media, and intimacy.

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Semantic holism and methodological constraints in the study of religion

Gardiner

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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False But Significant: The Development of Falsity in Religious Cognition in Light of the Holism of the Mental

Cited by 8 publications

References 23 publications

Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?

Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?

Beyond Heaven and Earth

Semantic holism and methodological constraints in the study of religion

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