False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences

Abstract

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.

Strategic Deception in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder

“… 2003 ; Senju 2012 ; Sommer et al. 2018 ). For example, eye-tracking research shows that, when watching the false-belief story unfold, people with ASD tend to look at the location where the marble is, whereas people without ASD tend to look at the location where the character thinks the marble is (Senju 2012 ).…”

“…However, various studies suggest that people with ASD who pass the false-belief task use a different, less automatic and more cumbersome strategy than people without ASD to solve the task (e.g., Begeer et al 2003;Senju 2012;Sommer et al 2018). For example, eye-tracking research shows that, when watching the false-belief story unfold, people with ASD tend to look at the location where the marble is, whereas people without ASD tend to look at the location where the character thinks the marble is (Senju 2012).…”

“…For example, eye-tracking research shows that, when watching the false-belief story unfold, people with ASD tend to look at the location where the marble is, whereas people without ASD tend to look at the location where the character thinks the marble is (Senju 2012). Similarly, fMRI research shows that people with ASD recruit a broader network of brain areas to solve the false-belief task, suggesting increased cognitive demands (Sommer et al 2018). As in the case of deception, then, the literature shows that people with and without ASD may solve the false-belief task in different ways: either by automatic perspective-taking or by a conscious and effortful compensatory strategy.…”

“…Similarly, fMRI research shows that people with ASD recruit a broader network of brain areas to solve the false-belief task, suggesting increased cognitive demands (Sommer et al. 2018 ). As in the case of deception, then, the literature shows that people with and without ASD may solve the false-belief task in different ways: either by automatic perspective-taking or by a conscious and effortful compensatory strategy.…”

Assessing Theory of Mind by Humor: The Humor Comprehension and Appreciation Test (ToM-HCAT)

“…Regarding autism, one of two main areas of impairment is that of social skills/communication: it is known that ASD patients exhibit the ability to share the emotions of others, but cannot mentalize ( Smith, 2006 ), which is an indicator of impaired cognitive empathy. As underlying causes of disorders, ToM impairments have been studied extensively ( Baron-Cohen, 2000 ; Losh et al, 2012 ; Chung et al, 2014 ; Sommer et al, 2018 ). Regarding schizophrenia, ToM impairments have been shown in unaffected relatives, ultra high-risk individuals, and first-episode patients as evidence of the trait-based nature of the disease ( Bora and Pantelis, 2013 ; Lavoie et al, 2013 ).…”