Fairy godfathers and magical elections: understanding the 2003 electoral crisis in Anambra State, Nigeria

Abstract

On 10 July 2003, a civilian coup was attempted in Anambra state in South-east Nigeria. Barely two months after Chris Ngige was sworn in as the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governor of Anambra, a team of armed policemen disarmed his security detail and took him into custody. The governor's attempted ousting made public the breakdown of his relationship with his political godfather, Chief Chris Uba, and sparked a debate on godfather politics in Nigeria. Using the case of Anambra, this article investigates the complex network of personalised relationships that holders of state power maintain with their national and local clientelistic constituencies. It explores the political underpinnings of the crisis and its links to national-level power dynamics, particularly within the ruling party and the Obasanjo presidency.

Has anything changed with illegitimate electoral financing and political power contestation in Nigeria?

“…The concept of godfather is rooted in certain traditions in many parts of Europe and America, especially in the Catholic Church, where it is originally associated with a man who provides inspiration, advice or support to a younger one for his overall betterment (Albert, 2005). However, political godfatherism is a corruption of this original ideal as it depicts a personal transactional relationship of varying dominance, which political actors enter into, based on their mutual self-interest to manipulate and exploit the resources of the state (Albert, 2005;Hoffmann, 2010). The phenomenon of godfatherism describes a system of influence whereby "certain individuals or groups of individuals possess the political, economic or social capacity to decide political party nominations, and to also ensure that these nominees gain political office for the chief purpose of servicing private interests" (Hoffmann, 2010, p. 291).…”

“…The implication was that all the expenses made by the candidates and their supporters were excluded, thus giving a field day to political godfathers. These flaws probably emboldened the godfathers to brazenly deploy their enormous wealth to "win" elections for their godsons in the 2003 elections (Albert, 2005;Edigin, 2010;Hoffmann, 2010).…”

DFID governance programming in Nigeria: What difference has thinking and working politically made in practice?

“…Citizens afflicted by poverty, inequality, powerlessness and lack of provision of public goods and services have low expectations of government and tend to shape their demands around accessing handouts and the immediate benefits of patronage. These dynamics are reflected in the conduct of elections where competition is shaped by money politics, vote buying and the behind‐the‐scenes influence of political financiers who monetize electoral politics in expectation of returns (Hoffman, ). Although elections led to a change in party political control (People's Democratic Party (PDP) to All Progressives Congress (APC)) in 2015 after 15 years of PDP Federal Government control, this does not appear to have led to any fundamental change in the “rules of the game” or a decisive shift from patronage to programmatic politics.…”

Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria

“…As Jane argued, people engage with the Nigerian state through securing and making claims on public office that is seen as an imperative if unpredictable link to central sources of finance that in turn gives rise to modes of clientage and prebendalism that dominate the Nigerian political landscape. Indeed, we may argue that this process has only intensified in the often zero-sum politics of patrimonialism that Nigeria has experienced since 1999 (Hoffmann 2010;. Being without a patron is risky and capturing a patron is a necessary labor.…”