2000
DOI: 10.1126/science.289.5485.1773
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Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game

Abstract: In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money. All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we develop an evolu… Show more

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Cited by 644 publications
(488 citation statements)
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“…Further, when subjects are alone, they do not pull the tool if the food is inaccessible, and they rarely pull for the defector; work in progress aims to quantify the costs and benefits of this action by placing weights on the tool (increasing costs) and manipulating the pay-offs to the recipients. The fact that subjects rapidly discriminated between the altruist and defector, raises the possibility that cooperation may depend on the reputation or image scores of other players, as it does in human games of cooperation (Nowak et al 2000;Milinski et al 2002). Minimally, it shows that tamarins discriminate among individuals based in part on information about their reinforcement or food-giving history.…”
Section: (B) Results and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, when subjects are alone, they do not pull the tool if the food is inaccessible, and they rarely pull for the defector; work in progress aims to quantify the costs and benefits of this action by placing weights on the tool (increasing costs) and manipulating the pay-offs to the recipients. The fact that subjects rapidly discriminated between the altruist and defector, raises the possibility that cooperation may depend on the reputation or image scores of other players, as it does in human games of cooperation (Nowak et al 2000;Milinski et al 2002). Minimally, it shows that tamarins discriminate among individuals based in part on information about their reinforcement or food-giving history.…”
Section: (B) Results and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[49][50][51]), and many of the genetic models for repeated interactions discussed in the previous section are presented as being equally valid for cultural transmission (e.g. [52]). …”
Section: Opinionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fairness has been proposed as an implicit shaper of social behaviour. For example, fairness has been shown to restrict profit-seeking in economic markets [2], to shape behaviour in economic games as a function of reputation [3] and to mould instant neural responses to economic offers [4]. In general terms, for species with highly developed sharing and cooperation standards, answering to fairness principles is essential to all its members [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%