Fair Profit Allocation in the Spectrum Auction Using the Shapley Value

Pan, Miao; Feng, Chen; Yin, Xiaoyan; Fang, Yuguang

doi:10.1109/glocom.2009.5425718

Cited by 19 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The accompanied dilemma between the booming growth of wireless services and the scarcity of radio spectrum has shoved the fixed spectrum allocation of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) off the edge, and poured out numerous new techniques, which allow the opportunistic access to the under-utilized spectrum bands [1][2][3][4]. Inspired by the mechanisms in microeconomics [5][6][7], auction seems to be one of the most promising solutions to the problem of vacant spectrum allocation to the potential unlicensed users [8][9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using homomorphic encryption to secure the combinatorial spectrum auction without the trustworthy auctioneer

2011

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Spectrum auction is an enabling technology for improving the spectrum efficiency of unused licensed bands (white spaces) in wireless networks. However, the back-room dealing (i.e., the frauds of the untrustworthy auctioneer and the bid-rigging between the greedy bidders and the insincere auctioneer) poses serious security challenges, leading to failures of all existing secure auction designs in allocating spectrum bands. In this paper, we propose a secure combinatorial spectrum auction (SCSA) by utilizing homomorphic encryption to prevent the backroom dealing. The idea in SCSA is to incorporate cryptographic techniques into the spectrum auction to address the frauds and bid-rigging. It computes and reveals the results of spectrum auction while the actual bidding values of bidders are kept confidential. SCSA also provides a corresponding procedure in implementing the combinatorial spectrum auction under the interference constraints. We show that compared with existing secure spectrum auction designs against the untrustworthy auctioneer, SCSA is much more efficient in both communication and computational complexity; and compared with other spectrum auction designs with security consideration, SCSA can effectively thwart the back-room dealings due to the untrustworthy auctioneer without too much performance degradation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using homomorphic encryption to secure the combinatorial spectrum auction without the trustworthy auctioneer

2011

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“…The only left issue for the SSP is to find a point on the CSF (i.e., to determine the proper value of η) to maximize his expected utility according to his own utility function subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ (1 − η) ≤ k, which is not difficult to solve by following a standard optimization procedure. 5 Please note the difference between σ (−1) X ij and (σ X ) −1 in Equation (9). In this section, we further demonstrate the theoretical results of band-mix selection by carrying out numerical simulations with different utility functions.…”

Section: E(ri)−rs σImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Specifically, in [2], Grandblaise et al generally describe the possible scenarios and introduce some microeconomics inspired mechanisms for opportunistic spectrum accessing (OSA), and in [3], Sengupta and Chatterjee propose an economic framework for OSA and service pricing to guide the design of dynamic spectrum allocation algorithms as well as service pricing mechanisms that the service providers can possibly use. From the view of system design, models in game theory, by Wang et al in [4] and Pan et al in [5], and auction This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0721744 and CNS-0916391. designs in microeconomics, by Zhou et al in [6] and Jia et al in [7], are exploited to construct the spectrum trading mechanisms with desired properties, such as Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, power efficiency, etc.. From the view of the primary service provider (PSP), Xing et al in [8] and Niyato et al in [9] have well investigated the spectrum pricing issues in the spectrum market, where multiple PSPs, whose goal is to maximize the monetary gains with their vacant spectrum, compete with each other to offer spectrum access to the secondary service provider (SSP).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reward and Risk for Opportunistic Spectrum Accessing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Pan

Song

et al. 2010

2010 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference GLOBECOM 2010

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Abstract-Cognitive Radio technology releases the spectrum from shackles of authorized licenses and facilitates the trading of spectrum bands. In the spectrum market, primary service providers (PSPs) set price for the vacant licensed bands of primary users (PUs) and sell them for monetary gains, and the secondary service provider (SSP) can buy the bands and opportunistically use them to satisfy the service demands of secondary users (SUs) when the primary services are not active. However, when there are multiple bands available, the SSP confronts the challenges of how to choose bands and how to split the overall traffic on them considering both his monetary reward and the potential risk, from the unpredictable activities of the primary services, for opportunistic spectrum accessing (OSA). In this paper, we propose a reward and risk based band-mix selection algorithm to address these concerns of the SSP, and help the SSP to make appropriate decisions of traffic splitting over available spectrum band-mix, consisting of both the band belonging to SSP itself and the bands from PSPs. By numerical simulations, we verify our theoretical analysis and show that the proposed spectrum band-mix selection effectively improves the spectrum utilization as well as the satisfactory degree of SUs.

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“…The constraints are derived from repeatedly solving an NP-hard integer program. Many other papers simply apply the Shapley Value to share profit or costs (see, e.g., [14]). In contrast to these approaches, we do not try to give concrete advice on how to share the profit, but rather outline the framework of possible profit sharing schemes that the monetary flow network allows.…”

Section: Introduction and Prerequisitesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows

et al. 2013

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In this paper we study the possibilities of sharing profit in combinatorial procurement auctions and exchanges. Bundles of heterogeneous items are offered by the sellers, and the buyers can then place bundle bids on sets of these items. That way, both sellers and buyers can express synergies between items and avoid the well-known risk of exposure (see, e.g., Cramton, Shoham, & Steinberg, Combinatorial Auctions, 2006). The reassignment of items to participants is known as the Winner Determination Problem (WDP). We propose solving the WDP by using a Set Covering formulation, because profits are potentially higher than with the usual Set Partitioning formulation, and subsidies are unnecessary. The achieved benefit is then to be distributed amongst the participants of the auction, a process which is known as profit sharing. The literature on profit sharing provides various desirable criteria. We focus on three main properties we would like to guarantee: Budget balance, mean ing that no more money is distributed than profit was generated, no negative transfers, which guarantees to each player that participation does not lead to a loss, and the core property, which provides every subcoalition with enough money to keep them from separating. We characterize all profit distributions that satisfy these three conditions by a monetary flow network and establish a connection to the famous VCG payment scheme (Clarke in Public Choice 18:19ff, 1971; Groves in Econometrica 41:617-631, 1973; Vickrey in J. Finance 16:8-37, 1961) and the Shapley Value (Shapley in Kuhn & Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. II, pp. 307-317, 1953). Finally, we introduce a novel profit sharing scheme based on scaling down VCG discounts using max-min fairness principles to achieve budget balance. It approximates the Shapley Value linearly in the number of bundles and can be computed efficiently

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Fair Profit Allocation in the Spectrum Auction Using the Shapley Value

Cited by 19 publications

References 23 publications

Using homomorphic encryption to secure the combinatorial spectrum auction without the trustworthy auctioneer

Using homomorphic encryption to secure the combinatorial spectrum auction without the trustworthy auctioneer

Reward and Risk for Opportunistic Spectrum Accessing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows

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