Fair cake-cutting in practice

Kyropoulou, Maria; Ortega, Josué; Segal-Halevi, Erel

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.027

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…In the context of allocating a divisible resource, procedures that are envy-free are perceived to be fairer by participants than those that are proportional (but necessarily not envy-free) (Kyropoulou, Ortega, and Segal-Halevi 2022).…”

Section: Perceived Fairness and Cognitive Aspectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making

Hosseini

2024

AAAI

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Fairness is one of the most desirable societal principles in collective decision-making. It has been extensively studied in the past decades for its axiomatic properties and has received substantial attention from the multiagent systems community in recent years for its theoretical and computational aspects in algorithmic decision-making. However, these studies are often not sufficiently rich to capture the intricacies of human perception of fairness in the ambivalent nature of the real-world problems. We argue that not only fair solutions should be deemed desirable by social planners (designers), but they should be governed by human and societal cognition, consider perceived outcomes based on human judgement, and be verifiable. We discuss how achieving this goal requires a broad transdisciplinary approach ranging from computing and AI to behavioral economics and human-AI interaction. In doing so, we identify shortcomings and long-term challenges of the current literature of fair division, describe recent efforts in addressing them, and more importantly, highlight a series of open research directions.

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Section: Perceived Fairness and Cognitive Aspectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making

Hosseini

2024

AAAI

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“…Such allocations are quite easy to compute when the number of agents is rather small and become harder when more agents come into play. Recently, we took an experimental approach aiming to understand how well-known cake-cu ing algorithms for computing fair allocations perform in practice [KOSH22]. We ran many di erent experiments, where human participants were asked to engage with each other or against automata, and investigated possible manipulations of the algorithms, a question that had only been considered in a small number of previous related papers.…”

Section: Fair Divisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance

Kampouridis

Kanellopoulos

Kyropoulou

et al. 2022

AIC

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In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and economic theory. In particular, we focus on the design and analysis of mechanisms for systems involving multiple strategic agents, both from a theoretical and an applied perspective. We present an overview of our group’s activities, as well as its members, and then discuss in detail past, present, and future work in multi-agent systems.

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“…Cerrone et al (2022) find that almost twice as many people (70% versus 40%) behave truthfully in the efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) mechanism versus standard DA, even though DA is strategy-proof and EADA is not. Truthful behavior is also more common in complex mechanisms in other setups, like cake-cutting(Kyropoulou et al, 2022).…”

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confidence: 99%

Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice

Ortega¹,

Klein²

2022

Preprint

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How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices owing to their outstanding stability and incentive properties. We show theoretically and empirically that both mechanisms perform poorly with regard to two key desiderata such as efficiency and equality, even in large markets. In contrast, the rank-minimizing mechanism is significantly more efficient and egalitarian. It is also Pareto optimal for the students, unlike DA, and generates less justified envy than TTC.

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Fair cake-cutting in practice

Cited by 5 publications

References 60 publications

The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making

The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making

Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance

Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice

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