Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money

Mukherjee, Conan

doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0733-3

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…23 Some authors also investigate the problem by other fairness axioms. See, for example, Ashlagi and Serizawa (2012) and Mukherjee (2014) for the axiom of anonymity in welfare, and see Sakai (2013) and Adachi (2014) for the axiom of weak envy-freeness for equals. 24 To be precise, he requires that the sum of the agents' payments have a lower bound.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Morimoto

Serizawa

2015

Theoretical Economics

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We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Morimoto

Serizawa

2015

Theoretical Economics

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“…By combining the above claims we have that the payments of a bribeproof mechanism must satisfy (20) and thus the theorem follows.…”

Section: C2 Proof Of Theorem 14mentioning

confidence: 78%

Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

Mihaľák

Penna

Widmayer

2016

Algorithmic Game Theory

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Schummer [28] introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome.This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for this setting. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: for several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.

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“…They show that any mechanism which always allocates the object, satisfies individual rationality, non-negativity of payments, anonymity in net utility, and dominant strategy incentive compatiblity must be the Vickrey auction. This result is further strengthened by Mukherjee (2013), who shows that any strategy-proof and anonymous (in net utility) mechanism which always allocates the object must use the efficient allocation rule. Further, Sakai (2012) characterizes the Vickrey auction with a reserve price using various axioms on the mechanism (this includes an axiom on the allocation rule which requires a weak version of efficiency).…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 95%

Non-bossy single object auctions

Mishra

Quadir

2014

Econ Theory Bull

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We study deterministic single object auctions in the private values environment. We show that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if it is a strongly rationalizable allocation rule. With a mild continuity condition, we show that an allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a simple utility maximizer (with appropriate tie-breaking). All our characterizations extend the seminal result of Roberts ("Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences", pp. 321-348, 1979) from the unrestricted domain to the restricted domain of single object auctions. Keywords Single object auction • Implementation • Rationalizability • Non-bossiness JEL Classification D44 An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "Deterministic Single Object Auctions with Private Values". We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments. We also thank

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Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money

Cited by 16 publications

References 26 publications

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

Non-bossy single object auctions

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