Fair allocations and equal incomes

Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive

“…Taking an asymptotic point of view, Roberts and Postlewaite [22] showed that the Walrasian mechanism becomes asymptotically incentive compatible; but they did not show the uniqueness of the Walrasian mechanism. For continuum economies, Hammond [10], Kleinberg [15], Champsaur and Laroque [2], McLennan [20], Mas-Colell [19], Nehring [21], and others have shown that the only efficient no-envyÂincentive-compatible allocations are Walrasian without transfers. Note, no-envy and incentive-compatible allocations are intimately related; see Section 6.…”

Zur optimalen Besteuerung

“…Zu Theorien über optimale Einkommensverteilungen vgl. insbesondere: Fair (1971), Tinbergen (1975, 117 -135), Tinbergen (1978), Hammond (1977), , Kapteyn/van Herwaarden (1980), Kleinberg (1980).…”

A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes

“…Apart from the papers mentioned above, results by Maskin [1977] and Thompson [1979,1982] show that any Nash implementable social choice correspondence is closely related to the equal income Walrasian correspondence. Furthermore, as Varian [1976], Hammond [1979], Kleinberg [1980], Champsaur and Laroque [1981] and Mas-Colell [1983, 1985 have shown, in economies with a large number of agents with sufficiently diverse characteristics the only fair outcomes are equal income Walrasian allocations. However, if there is not enough diversity or not enough agents it is known that many other fair and efficient allocations may exist.…”